Facts: Husband and Wife married in 2015 and had one Child, who has autism and needs developmental therapies, frequent medical care, educational support, routine, and stability. Wife was the family’s wage earner and the Child’s primary caregiver. Husband did not work outside the home after the parties moved to Tennessee, and the parties disputed the extent of his homemaking and parenting contributions.

Husband had a history of alcohol abuse, including seven driving-under-the-influence charges in three states. Wife testified about episodes in which his drinking interfered with caring for the Child. The trial court found that Husband struggled with binge drinking and completed his parenting classes only after the divorce trial began.

The parties presented conflicting evidence about the value of the marital residence. Husband valued it at slightly north of $300,000 and offered deeds for three purportedly comparable homes. Wife testified that the house could be worth $200,000 before substantial repairs and introduced photographs of its condition, and the Knox County Property Assessor valued the residence at $160,400. The trial court adopted the assessor’s value.

Neither party presented valuation evidence for Husband’s original artwork or tools. Husband listed the artwork as “sentimental/priceless” on the parties’ joint property and debt list, and the tools were not listed at all. Even so, the trial court imputed a value of $2,000 to the artwork and another $2,000 to the tools, awarded both to Husband, and included those amounts in the distribution of the marital estate.

The trial court awarded Wife 75% of the equity in the marital residence and Husband 25%. The total equity was $62,852.84, with Wife receiving $47,139.21 and Husband $15,713.21. The trial court found that Wife had been both the wage earner and the primary caregiver, while Husband made few meaningful contributions during extended periods of the marriage.

It also ordered Husband’s approximately $20,000 retroactive child-support obligation paid from his share of the marital estate, rather than at $55 per month over more than 30 years.

The permanent parenting plan allocated all 365 residential days to Wife and none to Husband. Until Husband obtained appropriate housing, he could visit the Child every other Sunday from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. at a shopping mall. He could not drive with the Child, leave the agreed premises, or consume or be under the influence of alcohol or any other substance during visits. The order did not mention TCA § 36-6-106(a), and its only reference to best interest was a single sentence at the end declaring that the plan served the children’s best interests.

Husband appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the residence valuation, unequal property division, and immediate payment of child-support arrears, but vacated the unsupported artwork and tool valuations and the permanent parenting plan.

Property valuation. In Tennessee, the trial court must consider all relevant evidence of value, the parties are bound by the evidence they present, and the court may place a value on an asset within the range of the evidence submitted. The parties bear the burden of presenting competent evidence of value. Thus, a trial court may weigh competing opinions, credit one party’s evidence over the other’s, and choose a figure within the evidentiary range, but it cannot fill a complete evidentiary void by imputing a number.

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the $160,400 valuation of the residence but that no evidence supported either $2,000 valuation for Husband’s artwork and tools:

Here, the trial court candidly acknowledged the lack of evidence presented for the value of Husband’s artwork and tools. The record supports this finding. Exhibit 1 was a joint property and debt list that was entered into evidence. Therein, “Husband’s original artwork” is listed under “property.” Wife did not present a value for this property, and Husband’s listed value was “sentimental/priceless.” Husband’s tools are not listed in Exhibit 1. Given the foregoing, there is simply no evidence to support the trial court assigning the $2,000 value to Husband’s artwork or the $2,000 value to his tools.

The Court of Appeals vacated those two valuations and directed the trial court on remand to remove the artwork and tools from the distribution table and recalculate each party’s distribution. By contrast, the residence valuation stayed within the evidentiary range because the assessor’s $160,400 figure was in evidence, and Wife’s testimony and photographs supported the trial court’s decision to reject Husband’s purported comparables, which lacked information about interior condition, lot size, square footage, renovations, basement space, and outbuildings.

Child support arrearage. A child support order is a judgment enforceable like any other judgment. The total arrearage and the schedule for paying it are distinct. Accrued support cannot be altered, reduced, or forgiven, but the court retains jurisdiction to modify the periodic payment amount. The Child Support Guidelines allow periodic payments in a retroactive support order, TCA § 36-5-101(a)(1) authorizes support out of a spouse’s property, and TCA § 36-5-101(a)(2) allows enforcement by any appropriate process.

Because a $55 monthly schedule would have taken more than 30 years to retire a judgment of roughly $20,000, and Husband was due to receive more than $22,000 from the marital estate, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court could require the arrearage to be satisfied from Husband’s distribution:

A distinction exists between a fixed award of arrearages and the payment schedule for that award. “A child support order is a judgment, enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment issued by a court of law.” Pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, courts may include a periodic payment amount in a retroactive support order. The judgment for Husband’s arrearage established the total amount of his obligation. The periodic payments of $55 per month simply governed the repayment of the obligation.

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Thus, while the trial court would not have had authority to modify the amount of Husband’s arrearage, it did maintain jurisdiction to modify the periodic payment amount. … We discern no error in the trial court’s decision to order Husband’s retroactive support be paid in full out of his portion of the Marital Estate rather than over a period of three decades.

The Court of Appeals rejected Husband’s argument that being current on the $55 installments insulated the unpaid judgment from a revised repayment method. It also rejected his reliance on the property-division factors in § 36-4-121, noting that § 36-5-101(a)(1) allows a court to order support out of a spouse’s property and that the enforcement language in § 36-5-101(a)(2) is non-exclusive.

Parenting restrictions. The Court of Appeals vacated the permanent parenting plan because the trial court imposed restrictions without findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how the evidence and governing law supported them.

The Court of Appeals did not decide that the restrictions were unjustified, holding instead that the order failed to explain why the parenting arrangement and its restrictions served the Child’s best interests:

The trial court’s order in this case does not make any mention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), and the only mention of the Child’s best interest is a declaration at the end of the order that “The Court finds that it is within the children’s best interests to adopt the permanent parenting plan recited herein.”

While we acknowledge that the trial court’s order contains factual findings that certainly bear on the Child’s best interests, the order fails to explain how any certain finding informed its entry of the Permanent Parenting Plan. We emphasize that the deficiency is not a lack of an express, factor-by-factor discussion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). The order does not discuss how the court evaluated the relevant facts or why the resulting parenting arrangement with restrictions served the Child’s best interests. In order to discern the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the parenting plan, we would have to speculate as to the connections between certain factual findings and the parenting plan determination that the court did not articulate.

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We recognize that the record in this case contains considerable evidence of Husband’s behavior that might warrant restrictions on his parenting time, and that the court’s analysis on remand may lead it to a similar conclusion. However, the lack of even any recognition that Husband’s parenting time was being limited under the plan leaves this Court and the parties to merely speculate as to the trial court’s reasoning for the decisions it made.

The Court of Appeals remanded for detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting a new parenting determination. The current plan remains in effect until the trial court enters a new temporary or permanent plan, and the trial court may hear additional proof about the current circumstances of the parties and the Child.

K.O.’s Comment: (1) The trial court may choose between competing valuations, but it cannot invent a number when nobody offers one. If you want artwork, tools, or another asset counted in the marital estate, put competent valuation proof in the record. “Sentimental/priceless” does not get you there.

(2) Lawyers seeking restrictions on parenting time should consider drafting proposed findings that connect the evidence to each significant restriction. A record full of concerning conduct is not a substitute for explaining why the particular schedule protects the Child. Here, the appellate court left open the possibility that the same restrictions could be justified on remand.

Source: Skatzes v. Skatzes (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, October 27, 2026).

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