Facts: Mother and Father are the never-married parents of Child. When their relationship ended, both sought orders of protection against the other.

Mother received an ex parte order of protection prohibiting Father from contacting Mother and her children “either directly or indirectly, by phone, email, messages, mail, or any other type of communication or contact.”

A subsequent agreed order changed the ex parte order to allow for Father’s parenting time with Child every Wednesday and certain Saturdays. It further provided that the exchanges would occur at Child’s daycare provider and the local sheriff’s department.

One month later, Father sent a text message to Mother about their Internet service provider. Father was trying to transfer the service into his name and needed Mother to speak with the provider to allow the change. Father texted: “XFINITY is calling you now. Please answer. I’m here now. I didn’t realize the account was apparently just in your name when I transferred.” Father, a doctor, testified he had telehealth appointments the next day with several high-needs patients and was worried about being able to contact them.

Two days later, Mother and Father met at the Sheriff’s Department to exchange custody of Child. After the exchange, Father approached Mother’s car and began speaking about events surrounding the XFINITY account. The content of those communications was disputed, but everyone agreed that Father approached Mother’s car and began to speak to her.

Father was charged with two counts of criminal contempt for violating the no-contact provision in the order of protection. The trial court found Father guilty of both contempt charges and ordered him to pay a $10 fine for each violation.

Father appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

There are four essential elements to a charge of criminal contempt:

1. the order allegedly violated was lawful;
2. the order was clear, specific, and unambiguous;
3. the individual charged actually violated the order; and
4. the individual acted willfully in violating the order.

When a court finds someone in contempt based on disobedience of a court order, the order underlying the charge must be clear, specific, and unambiguous.

Vague or ambiguous orders that can be interpreted as having more than one reasonable understanding cannot support contempt charges. An order need not be full of superfluous terms and specifications to avoid being vague. Courts reviewing orders alleged to have been violated should interpret any ambiguities in the order in favor of the person facing the contempt charge. Courts evaluating an order alleged to have been violated apply an objective standard that considers both the language of the order and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order, including the audience to whom the order is addressed.

Orders that form the basis for a contempt charge must expressly and precisely spell out the details of compliance so that reasonable people will know exactly what actions are required or forbidden. Orders underlying a finding of contempt must leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding their meaning. In contempt cases, courts should not go beyond the four corners of the order to clarify an ambiguity.

Here, the Court found the no-contact order was not clear, specific, and unambiguous:

[W]e have concluded that the underlying orders are not sufficiently clear and unambiguous. It is unclear from the two orders what actions are required or forbidden. The ambiguity arises from the different terms contained in the two orders regarding contact between the parties. The initial [] order prohibited all contact between [Father] and [Mother] and her children. This order was then incorporated into the [subsequent] order by adding a visitation schedule and designating how the parties’ child was to be exchanged by the two parties but did not address the no-contact provision. Thus, [Father] was both prohibited from contacting [Mother] and required to meet her weekly to exchange their child. These conflicting orders create an ambiguity and, therefore, they are not sufficient for a conviction of criminal contempt.

On appeal, [Mother] argues that the [subsequent] order only modifies the [initial] order to allow for the exchange of the child without modifying the no-contact provision at all. [Mother] appears to understand the two orders as meaning no verbal communication between the two parties, regardless of other mandated events like exchanging their child. However, the [initial] order does not make this subtle distinction. The [initial] order specifically orders [Father] not to “contact [Mother or her children] either directly or indirectly, by phone, email, messages, mail, or any other type of communication or contact.” The order not only proscribed verbal communication with [Mother], but also proscribed any contact at all with [Mother]…. The subsequent order mandating [Father] to meet with [Mother] regularly creates an ambiguity regarding how [Father] is to both not contact [Mother] and meet with her regularly.

*     *     *     *     *

Construing the ambiguity in favor of [Father], we find that the ambiguities are such that the orders cannot support a conviction of contempt. The determination that the order which was allegedly violated lacked specificity and was ambiguous requires a reversal of the convictions of contempt.

The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment.

Source: Lehmann v. Wilson (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, March 4, 2024).

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