Facts: Mother and Father are the divorced parents of two children.

Their parenting plan provided for equal time via alternating weeks. As for decision-making, Father had sole decision-making authority over the children’s major decisions about nonemergency healthcare and extracurricular activities, while Mother had sole decision-making authority over the children’s major educational decisions.

Each parent had to consult with the other and try to reach a consensus over the type of decision for which they were entrusted with sole decision-making authority, but each could act unilaterally and make a final decision without consensus.

One child was sent to the emergency room after passing out at school. The child was referred to a gastrointestinal specialist. The doctor’s office called Mother to schedule a follow-up appointment, but Mother informed the doctor’s office that Father would need to schedule the appointment. She then emailed Father about the call, but Father did not respond.

When the doctor’s office called Mother a second time, she scheduled the appointment to preserve the date. She then emailed Father the same day to inform him she had done so and told him he could cancel the appointment if he wanted to. Remember, Father had sole decision-making authority over the children’s nonemergency healthcare decisions.

Over six months later, Father filed a petition for criminal contempt because Mother scheduled the child’s medical appointment. Mother was found in contempt and sentenced to serve nine days in jail, which sentence was stayed pending appeal.

The trial court also entered an order reflecting its sua sponte modification of the parenting plan that added language granting Father “tie-breaking authority” over decisions related to the children’s non-school-related extracurricular activities. The order also provided that if Mother did not agree to a non-school-related extracurricular activity selected by Father, then Father could take the children to the activity, even if it was Mother’s parenting time, if Father paid for and provided transportation for the activity.

Mother appealed, arguing the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to change the parenting plan sua sponte.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s changes to the parenting plan.

Generally, trial courts have exclusive and continuing subject-matter jurisdiction over postdivorce child custody disputes. Courts may not, however, modify parenting plans sua sponte.

In Tennessee, trial courts retain exclusive control over the domestic relations orders they enter, but they lose the right to exercise their conclusive control over closed matters unless and until a party takes the steps to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

There are two ways to awaken the trial court’s jurisdiction from this period of rest. First, a parent may file a petition or complaint for modification along with a proposed parenting plan. Second, a parent may file a Rule 60 motion for relief from the trial court’s judgment.

Here, the Court found the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to change the parenting plan when neither party requested any changes:

Although the parties had continued to litigate postdivorce, namely over Father’s petition for contempt against Mother, the record reflects that neither party had filed a petition to modify the [parenting plan] or a Rule 60 motion for relief from the final decree for divorce and final judgment. In this case, the trial court issued the order to modify on its own initiative in a purported attempt to resolve continuing conflict between the parties after the final decree of divorce had been entered. We therefore find that the trial court here lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the [parenting plan] because neither party had filed the requisite petition (complaint) and summons to afford the trial court the right to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic decrees it had previously entered.

The Court reversed the trial court’s changes to the parenting plan.

Source: Corenswet v. Corenswet (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, February 7, 2024).

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