Facts: Child was born in July 2022. Mother died in August 2024, and Father subsequently obtained custody. After Father was arrested and incarcerated, the juvenile court awarded custody to Paternal Grandparents. Maternal Grandmother was allowed to intervene in the juvenile court custody proceeding.

Paternal Grandparents then filed a petition in chancery court to terminate Father’s parental rights and adopt Child. Father joined the petition and consented to the termination and adoption. Although the petition disclosed the pending juvenile court custody case, the chancery court entered a final decree of adoption the same day the petition was filed.

Maternal Grandmother learned of the adoption after the decree was entered. She moved under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(2) and (5) to set aside the decree, arguing that Paternal Grandparents failed to notify the juvenile court as required by TCA § 36-1-113(d)(4) and prevented her from intervening in the adoption case. She did not file a motion or petition to intervene in the chancery court proceeding.

The trial court denied relief. It reasoned that § 36-1-113(d)(4) requires notice to the court where the earlier custody proceeding is pending, not additional notice to the parties in that case. The trial court also questioned Maternal Grandmother’s standing and noted the statutory policy favoring finality of adoption decrees.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Standing determines whether the person invoking judicial power is entitled to a decision on the merits. The claimant must show a distinct and palpable injury, causation, and an injury the court can remedy. When the asserted interest is statutory, the claim must fall within the statute’s protected or regulated zone of interests. Standing focuses on the claimant’s legal position, not the strength of the underlying argument, and it cannot be waived in a termination or adoption case. A person who was neither made a party nor sought intervention cannot participate in the case or obtain post-judgment relief.

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(f) and 3(i), together with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24, likewise require an appellant to be a party or a person who filed a motion to intervene. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-115(b) allows an intervening adoption petitioner to proceed without already having physical custody, but that exception did not help Maternal Grandmother because she never filed an intervening petition.

Because Maternal Grandmother never moved to intervene in the adoption case, the Court of Appeals held that she lacked standing to challenge the decree or pursue an appeal:

The doctrine of standing is used to determine whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief. It requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant a judicial resolution of the dispute. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) that it has sustained a distinct and palpable injury, (2) that the injury was caused by the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury is one that can be addressed by a remedy that the court is empowered to give.

The primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of the claim. Thus, a party’s standing does not depend on the likelihood of success of its claim on the merits.

The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will create standing must be an injury to a recognized legal right or interest. In many cases, this right or interest may be created or defined by statute. Thus, in cases where a party is seeking to vindicate a statutory right of interest, the doctrine of standing requires the party to demonstrate that its claim falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in question.

[S]tanding is an issue that cannot be waived in a termination of parental rights/adoption case.

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Predicated upon longstanding precedent, we determine that Maternal Grandmother lacked standing to seek post-judgment relief in the adoption proceedings by reason of her failure to file a petition to intervene in those proceedings. We further determine that she likewise lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s disposition of the post-judgment motion.

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When “a person is not made a party of record to a lawsuit, he has no standing therein which enables him to take part in the proceedings.”

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Here, Maternal Grandmother was not a party to the adoption proceedings and failed to file a petition to intervene in those proceedings. Accordingly, she lacked standing to seek post-judgment relief concerning entry of the adoption decree.

Moreover, inasmuch as Maternal Grandmother was not a party to the underlying proceedings and failed to file a motion to intervene therein, she also lacks standing to pursue this appeal.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

K.O.’s Comment: This opinion is a blunt reminder that being right on the merits is useless if you are not properly before the court. Maternal Grandmother had intervened in the juvenile court custody case, but that status did not carry over when the adoption petition shifted jurisdiction to chancery court. Once she learned of the adoption, the safer course was to file a Rule 24 motion to intervene, together with any proposed intervening adoption petition or Rule 60 request, rather than filing only a motion to set aside. In re Lyric N. illustrates the difference: the aunt there could seek post-judgment relief because she had properly sought intervention. If a nonparty seeks relief, party status should be the first issue addressed, not an afterthought.

Source: In re Adeline S. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, October 26, 2026).

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