Facts: Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of Child. A September 2022 parenting plan designated Mother as the primary residential parent, awarded her 265 residential days and Father 100 days, and allowed Mother to relocate to Massachusetts with Child. Mother never moved to Massachusetts.

In March 2023, Mother petitioned to modify the plan after Father moved from California to Missouri and returned to military service. Father counter-petitioned, alleging Mother had repeatedly interfered with his parenting time and communication with Child and asking to be designated primary residential parent. Mother also sought to relocate to Arizona to live with a fiancé, moved there with Child for two to three weeks, and then returned to Texas after the relationship ended.

The proof focused on Mother’s repeated relocation plans, changing relationships, and credibility. Mother married Wife in November 2022, later became engaged to a former boyfriend while still married, and sought permission to relocate to Arizona to live with Fiancé without disclosing to Father or the trial court that she was already married. The trial court found Mother not credible about the timing of her marriage and her representations concerning the proposed relocation

Father described recurring barriers to his parenting time. Mother imposed advance-notice requirements not found in the parenting plan, refused to allow parenting time in Missouri until a hearing occurred, denied Father’s Veterans Day parenting time because he did not provide the notice she demanded, and required his calls with Child to pass through her phone. Father allowed direct communication between Mother and Child and encouraged Child to respond to Mother during his parenting time.

Mother had been Child’s primary caregiver, handled most daily care, and maintained a close emotional relationship with Child. The trial court nevertheless credited Father’s testimony that Child was disrespectful toward Mother, Mother did not adequately correct the behavior, and Father maintained appropriate parental boundaries. Father presented proof of a stable home with Wife and Child’s half-sister.

The trial court found a material change in circumstances and concluded that changing the primary residential parent was in Child’s best interest. It designated Father the primary residential parent, increased his parenting time from 100 to 245 days, and reduced Mother’s parenting time from 265 to 120 days.

Mother appealed only the trial court’s application of the best-interest factors.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Tennessee courts use a two-step analysis to modify a permanent parenting plan: first, the court determines whether a material change in circumstances occurred; second, if a material change occurred, the court determines whether modification serves Child’s best interest.

Because Mother did not challenge the material-change finding, only best interest remained at issue. Child’s best interest is paramount, and the trial court must consider the applicable factors in TCA § 36-6-106(a), but those factors are not a scorecard. Their relevance and weight depend on the circumstances, and one factor may be determinative.

The Court of Appeals held that, despite acknowledged flaws in portions of the trial court’s factor-by-factor analysis, the ultimate best-interest determination fell within the range of reasonable outcomes and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

On factor (6), love and emotional ties, the Court of Appeals rejected Mother’s argument that the factor should favor her or be neutral simply because Child loves both parents:

Factor 6 is not a simple measurement of emotional intensity but considers the healthiness of the emotional ties between parent and child. The trial court concluded that aspects of the emotional relationship between parent and child with Mother and [Child] undermined an appropriate parent-child relationship. We cannot say that the record preponderates against such a conclusion or that the trial court erred by considering the healthiness of the parent-child emotional attachment in its analysis of this factor.

On factor (7), Child’s emotional and developmental needs, the Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion:

With regard to the emotional intensity of the relationship between Mother and [Child], the trial court’s findings are not inconsistent with this contention. The factor, however, is addressed to the child’s emotional needs. Here, the trial court is identifying something problematic in the nature of Mother’s relationship with the child that is adversely impacting meeting the child’s needs with regard to shaping of behavior. We cannot say that such consideration is misplaced in assessing the emotional needs of the child.

On factor (5), primary caregiver status, Mother argued the trial court erred by failing to credit her as Child’s primary caregiver. The Court of Appeals found the argument misplaced because the trial court had, in fact, agreed with her on that point, but weighed the factor in Father’s favor for a different reason:

The trial court, however, did not disagree with her on this point. To the contrary, the trial court agreed with Mother that she was the primary caretaker of [Child]. Indeed, rather than finding Father to be the primary caregiver, the trial court found this factor to favor Father because of Mother thwarting Father’s efforts at visitation. Mother’s argument on appeal fails to counter the trial court’s actual reasoning. Her argument slips past the trial court’s reasoning without engaging with it.

Mother also argued the trial court improperly double counted factors (9) and (10) by discussing each twice in its order. The Court of Appeals agreed the repetition was unnecessary but found it did not undermine the ultimate conclusion:

We agree that the trial court unnecessarily repeated its analysis of the two factors. Statutory best interest analysis is not, however, a mathematical exercise, and trial courts do not determine custody by mechanically tallying the statutory factors.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

K.O.’s Comment: Custody cases are rarely won or lost by counting statutory factors. Better advocacy organizes the proof around the few facts that explain why a proposed change will improve the child’s life. Here, the decisive narrative was instability, obstruction of Father’s relationship with Child, and unhealthy parental boundaries, not whether one parent technically won more factors than the other.

Source: Trimble v. Vela (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, September 10, 2026).

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