Facts: Mother and Father divorced in 2022. Their agreed parenting plan provided for equal parenting time, shared decision-making, a split-week schedule, alternating weekends, and alternating holidays. If they lived in different school zones, they were to select Child’s school together based on comparable academic rankings, with priority given to the highest-ranking school.

By 2024, Child was preparing to begin kindergarten, and Parents lived in different school zones. Mother petitioned to modify the parenting plan, alleging Father began enrolling the Child at the school in his zone without her consent. Mother sought an alternating-week schedule, designation as primary residential parent, and enrollment in the school in her zone, which she said was academically comparable to Father’s preferred school.

Father disputed that he enrolled Child in the school he was zoned for, describing his actions as preliminary paperwork. He argued that one measure showing an advantage of about four percentage points made the school in his zone the higher-ranked school under the parenting plan, “because better is better—even if only by a slim margin.” He accused Mother of misrepresentation, bad faith, and perjury, requested sanctions and attorney’s fees, and moved to dismiss her petition.

The trial court found a material change in circumstances because Child reached school age and Mother relocated for employment. After analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, it preserved equal parenting time and shared decision-making but changed the split-week schedule to alternating weeks with a midweek overnight, designated Mother as primary residential parent, and selected the school in Mother’s zone. The trial court found the schools academically comparable and concluded that Parents’ employment schedules, help from Mother’s parents, and maximizing each parent’s time favored that school.

The trial court initially required each parent to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. Father then filed a 19-page consolidated post-judgment motion with 32 numbered paragraphs and subparagraphs, sought sanctions and attorney’s fees, and later moved to strike Mother’s responses. After the post-judgment proceedings, the trial court awarded Mother $8,000 of the $12,375.50 in attorney’s fees she incurred.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the modified parenting plan and the attorney’s-fee award and remanded for the calculation of Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

Modification of Parenting Plan. A request to modify a residential parenting schedule requires two determinations:

• whether a material change of circumstance occurred under TCA § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)-(C), and
• whether modification serves the Child’s best interest under TCA § 36-6-106(a).

The threshold for a material change in residential-schedule cases is “very low,” recognizing that children’s needs change as they grow, and that changes involving a child’s age or a parent’s living or working conditions may qualify.

Once that threshold is crossed, § 36-6-106(a) calls for a child-centered analysis that considers, among other things, the parents’ residences, the child’s need for stability, each parent’s employment schedule, continuity, the child’s school and surroundings, and the maximum participation possible for both parents.

The Court of Appeals held that Child’s transition to school age and Mother’s employment-related relocation satisfied the material-change threshold and that the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the modified schedule and school placement served Child’s best interest:

In its December 2024 order, the trial court found that a material change of circumstance had occurred where 1) the child reached school age and 2) Mother had relocated to Pleasant View for employment. There is no dispute in this case that the child has reached school age, and we are not persuaded by Father’s argument that no change of circumstance has occurred because Oakland Elementary is located near the child’s preschool. While the child has attended pre-school for the past two years, he presumably will be enrolled in the public school system for the next 13 years, and the courts have long recognized a child’s critical need for stability. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that a material change of circumstance has occurred, and we turn to whether modification of the parenting schedule is in the child’s best interest.

The best-interest analysis did not produce a dramatic redistribution of parenting time. Child was thriving, most factors favored the Parents equally, and both were found to be good parents who cared deeply for Child. The modification preserved equal parenting time while reducing the back-and-forth of the split-week arrangement, and the midweek overnight meant Child would not spend an uninterrupted week away from either Parent while that provision remained in effect.

The Court also rejected Father’s claim that the trial court had to select the school in his zone based on the asserted difference in test scores. The evidence showed approximately equal scores and did not establish that either school was superior. The trial court could instead weigh the Parents’ employment schedules, available family assistance, stability, location, and the goal of maximizing each Parent’s time with the Child.

Attorney’s Fees. TCA § 36-5-103(c) gives trial courts discretion to award attorney’s fees in proceedings to modify a permanent parenting plan, The Court recognized that this case did not involve a straightforward disparity in the Parents’ financial resources. Instead, the disparity arose from Father’s ability, as a licensed attorney, to perform much of his own legal work while requiring Mother to pay counsel to respond.

The opinion first placed the fee statute in its post-divorce context:

[I]t is not unusual in family law cases to see an obligor former spouse with significant monetary resources force a financially disadvantaged ex-spouse to incur attorney fees post-divorce to enforce or defend alimony, child support, or a parenting plan originally ordered by the trial court.

Father’s own counsel described how Father’s attorney status affected the economics of the litigation:

[Father] is himself an attorney and took an active role in representing himself throughout the litigation. He was primarily responsible for preparing pleadings, drafting motions, and managing exhibits and filings. My services were limited to strategic consultations, select drafting and review/revisions, and representation at hearings.

Father paid his counsel a $3,500 flat fee, while Mother incurred $12,375.50 because she could not provide comparable assistance to her attorney. The trial court found that Father’s participation went beyond economical self-help. It produced lengthy and verbose pleadings, delayed entry of the judgment, complicated an otherwise straightforward dispute, and increased the work Mother’s counsel had to perform.

The trial court explained:

Were it not for [Father’s] attempts to be overly burdensome, oppressive, and controlling of the litigation, as a practicing attorney, this was and still remains a relatively simple case factually, only complicated by [Father]. Were [Father] not an attorney, this matter would have been much less tedious and costly for his Ex-Wife/the Mother. . . . It is clear to the Court that [Father] has undertaken completing most of the lengthy and verbose pleadings filed on his behalf throughout these proceedings. This has enabled [Father] to save a great deal of fees, but has resulted in an amplification and increase of the fees of the Wife and her counsel contending with [Father’s] attempts to control these matters, especially after the final hearing.

The Court also rejected Father’s argument that the trial court reconsidered fees on its own initiative. Although the original ruling required each Parent to pay his or her own fees, Father placed fees back before the court by requesting them in his consolidated post-judgment motion. The court could therefore reconsider the issue during the proceedings generated by that motion, and it did not abuse its discretion by awarding Mother $8,000 after applying Rule 1.5.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings.

K.O.’s Comment: (1) The low threshold for modifying a residential schedule does not eliminate the two-step analysis. Proof of a material change is still required before the court considers best interest. Lawyers should connect the child’s development and the parents’ changed circumstances to concrete problems with the existing schedule, rather than assume starting school automatically requires modification.

(2) A school-selection clause should not be treated as a mathematical algorithm. A slight advantage in one testing measure did not require the trial court to ignore employment schedules, transportation, family assistance, stability, and maximum parental participation. Lawyers drafting these provisions should consider identifying the data to be compared, the relevant school year, and what happens when the available measures point in different directions.

Source: Bagwell v. Bagwell (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, August 31, 2026).

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