Facts: Two Neighbors—Ms. Kelley and Ms. Bowden—lived across the street from each other at the end of a dead-end street. Their relationship deteriorated after a dispute over a visitor’s box trailer. Over the next several years, each neighbor repeatedly called the police about the other.

Ms. Kelley petitioned for an order of protection, alleging Ms. Bowden followed and photographed her, drove too close to her vehicle, confronted her over a trash can, aimed security cameras at her home, and entered her property despite no-trespassing signs. Ms. Kelley claimed this conduct left her unable to feel safe or at peace in her home.

Ms. Bowden filed a competing petition alleging Ms. Kelley followed and photographed her, took hundreds of photographs of her and her property, trapped her animals, disparaged her to neighbors and others, and displayed signs directed at her.

At trial, Ms. Kelley introduced 728 photographs (!!!), many of which were taken secretly from inside her home or while she hid in her garage. The proof also showed that Ms. Kelley displayed at least 10 signs targeting Ms. Bowden, trapped and relocated several of Ms. Bowden’s cats without revealing their location, and recorded herself loudly insulting Ms. Bowden while Ms. Bowden stood in her own yard.

The trial court denied Ms. Kelley’s petition and granted Ms. Bowden’s petition. It found Ms. Bowden’s conduct would not cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. The trial court found Ms. Kelley’s surveillance, signs, treatment of the cats, and verbal confrontation constituted stalking and awarded Ms. Bowden $8,554.36 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Ms. Kelley appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

In Tennessee, a petitioner seeking an order of protection must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner suffered one of the harms listed in TCA § 36-3-605(b).

Under the statutes in effect when these petitions were filed, TCA § 36-3-601(12) defined a stalking victim as any person, regardless of the parties’ relationship, who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of stalking as defined in TCA § 39-17-315. In relevant part, TCA § 39-17-315(a)(4) defines stalking as a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment that would cause a reasonable person, and that actually causes the victim, to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. A course of conduct generally requires at least two separate, noncontinuous acts evidencing continuity of purpose and may include following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, communicating with a person, or interfering with property.

Harassment includes repeated or continuing unconsented contact undertaken with reckless disregard for whether the victim will suffer emotional distress, where the victim in fact suffers emotional distress, but it excludes constitutionally protected activity and conduct serving a legitimate purpose.

The Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s finding that Ms. Kelley’s conduct constituted stalking while Ms. Bowden’s conduct did not, quoting the trial court’s reasoning:

[P]ursuant to TCA § 39-17-315, a reasonable person would not “feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested…” by the actions of [Ms. Bowden]. This Court finds that [Ms. Kelley] is unreasonable and is the instigator of many of the interactions she has had with [Ms. Bowden]. Seemingly, [Ms. Kelley] has developed a set of rules for proper and improper courses of conduct. Further, [Ms. Kelley] is determined to hold [Ms. Bowden] to the same standards, despite the fact that [Ms. Bowden] has private property rights and is not breaking any laws of the State of Tennessee or ordinances of the City of Lawrenceburg.

The quantity, nature, and secrecy of Ms. Kelley’s photographs were especially significant to the finding of a willful course of surveillance. The trial court found the following, which the Court of Appeals quoted with approval:

[T]he photographs depict [Ms. Bowden], her property, including her backyard, vehicle, golf cart, cats, trashcan, etc. Many of the photographs have clearly been taken from inside [Ms. Kelley’s] house, as evidence[d] by the blinds being visible in the photograph. Further, [Ms. Kelley] testified that many of the photographs were taken while [Ms. Kelley] hid in her garage.

Various photographs clearly illustrate [Ms. Kelley] is, and has been, spying on [Ms. Bowden]. For example, photograph #96, depicts [Ms. Bowden] in her vehicle stopped at a stop sign having, what appears to be, a conversation with a driver in another vehicle. The illustrated interaction should have been of no consequence to [Ms. Kelley], yet [Ms. Kelley], hiding in the recesses of her home, took a picture of [Ms. Bowden].

It would be exhaustive and impossible for this Court to detail each and every photograph taken by [Ms. Kelley]. Suffice to say, the sheer volume of photographs provided by [Ms. Kelley], the nature and subject matter of the photographs, and the fact that (as admitted by [Ms. Kelley]) many of the photographs were taken in secret is tantamount to prima facie evidence of stalking.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that the outcome depended heavily on the trial court’s evaluation of the proof and witness credibility:

Resolution of this case is particularly dependent upon the trial court’s evaluation of the facts and, more specifically, the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court fully evaluated both, and we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s findings and conclusions, which are all supported by the record.

Mutual hostility did not require mutual orders of protection. The opinion favorably quotes the trial court’s acknowledgment that Ms. Bowden sometimes behaved poorly and participated in the escalating conflict, but it found her conduct did not satisfy the statutory definition of stalking:

[T]he Court does not want to leave the impression that [Ms. Bowden] has been completely innocent and guilt-free in her conduct. This Court recognizes that [Ms. Bowden] has behaved poorly at times. However, based on [Ms. Kelley’s] testimony, this neighborhood war started over a parked trailer in the dead-end section of 8th Street. [Ms. Kelley’s] anger and spite regarding such is entirely unreasonable and illogical – and it leads this Court to conclude that [Ms. Kelley], metaphorically, threw the first punch. Rather than maintaining her own reputation, at times, [Ms. Bowden] became an active participant in [Ms. Kelley’s] war. Regardless, [Ms. Bowden’s] actions do not rise to the level of stalking.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and awarded Ms. Bowden her attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal.

K.O.’s Comment: A contentious relationship does not automatically justify competing orders of protection. Tennessee’s stalking definition requires a willful course of harassment, an effect on a reasonable person, and an actual emotional effect on the petitioner. Lawyers should organize the evidence around each statutory element rather than relying on a general history of hostility. Irritating, discourteous, or immature behavior is not necessarily stalking.

Source: Kelley v. Bowden (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, August 20, 2026).

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