Facts: Father and Mother had three Children. In 2015, the family moved from California to Middle Tennessee. Two years later, Maternal Grandfather and Maternal Step-Grandmother also moved to Middle Tennessee to be closer to the Children.

Father and Mother divorced in 2019. Mother died in June 2023.

After Mother’s death, Father and Grandfather initially cooperated to maintain Grandfather’s relationship with the Children. Grandfather kept a calendar showing frequent contact during the second half of 2023, including overnight visits, holidays, school breaks, and other extended time with the Children.

Grandfather testified that Father began restricting his contact with the Children in early 2024. The proof showed that Grandfather’s contact thereafter largely consisted of attending soccer games, a handful of visits supervised by Father, almost no overnight visits or holidays, and limited telephone contact. Father also blocked Grandfather’s phone number from the oldest Child’s phone.

Grandfather petitioned for grandparent visitation under TCA § 36-6-306.

The trial court found that Father severely reduced Grandfather’s visitation, that the reduction presented a likelihood of substantial harm to the Children, and that visitation was in the Children’s best interest.

The trial court awarded Grandfather one weekend each month, two dinners during months without a weekend visit, birthday visits, seven days during the summer, holiday visitation, and weekly telephone calls.

The trial court denied Grandfather’s request for attorney’s fees.

Father appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals vacated the visitation order and remanded for the trial court to apply the correct legal standard.

Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute applies only when one of the circumstances listed in TCA § 36-6-306(a) exists. One such circumstance exists when the child’s parent is deceased.

Even then, the petitioning grandparent must prove that the custodial parent opposed grandparent visitation or severely reduced it. If the grandparent fails to make that threshold showing, the trial court cannot proceed to determine whether the child faces substantial harm or whether grandparent visitation is in the child’s best interest.

The trial court did not find that Father opposed or denied Grandfather’s visitation. Instead, it found that Father severely reduced Grandfather’s visitation.

TCA § 36-6-306(f) defines a “severe reduction” as a reduction to no contact or token visitation as defined in TCA § 36-1-102(1)(C).

Because Grandfather continued to have some contact with the Children, the relevant question was whether that contact constituted token visitation.

Token visitation is visitation that, under the circumstances of the individual case, is merely perfunctory, is so infrequent, or is so brief that it creates only minimal or insubstantial contact with the child.

Whether visitation is token visitation requires a fact-intensive examination of the frequency, duration, and quality of the contact.

The trial court did not perform that analysis. Instead, it compared the visitation Grandfather enjoyed before January 2024 with the visitation Father allowed after January 2024.

The Court of Appeals explained:

The Grandparent Visitation Statute defines ‘severe reduction’ or ‘severely reduced’ to ‘mean[] reduction to no contact or token visitation as defined in § 36-1-102.’

The statutory definition does not measure severe reduction by comparing the grandparent’s present visitation with the visitation previously enjoyed.

Instead:

[W]hether visitation is “token” under [the statutory] definition is a fact-intensive inquiry to be decided on a case-by-case basis,’ which ‘requires that we examine the frequency, duration, and quality of the visits that occurred.’

Grandfather argued that seeing the Children at soccer games did not constitute meaningful visitation and amounted to only perfunctory contact. The Court of Appeals agreed that those interactions were relevant to the token-visitation analysis but held that the trial court never conducted that analysis.

The Court explained:

[T]he trial court did not evaluate whether the visitation afforded to [Grandfather] after January 2024 amounted to token visitation as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(C) and merely engaged in a comparison of [Grandfather’s] visitation pre-January 2024 and post-January 2024[.]

Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, it abused its discretion.

The Court of Appeals vacated the visitation order and instructed the trial court to determine whether Grandfather’s remaining contact with the Children constituted token visitation.

Only if the trial court finds a severe reduction may it proceed to determine whether the Children face substantial harm. Only after finding substantial harm may it consider whether grandparent visitation is in the Children’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals clarified that the trial court need not reopen the proof on remand. It may make the required findings based on the evidence presented at trial.

K.O.’s Comment: A dramatic reduction in visitation is not necessarily a “severe reduction” under Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute. The comparison may help explain why the grandparent filed suit, but it does not answer the statutory question.

The trial court must examine the contact that remains. How often does it occur? How long does it last? What happens during the contact? Does the grandparent have a meaningful opportunity to interact with the child, or is the contact merely incidental, brief, or superficial?

Clark v. Johnson illustrates the point. There, the grandparents had more than 40 contacts with the children during the 11 months before suit was filed. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory definition does not measure token visitation by comparing current contact with a previously stronger relationship. This new opinion reinforces that holding.

The statute imposes a sequence. First, prove opposition or severe reduction. Second, prove substantial harm. Third, prove that visitation is in the child’s best interest. Skipping the first step risks reversal, regardless of how compelling the remaining proof may be.

Source: Oliver v. Goodman (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, July 30, 2026).

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