Facts: The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services first became involved with Child in April 2023 after a domestic-violence referral. Child was removed from Mother’s custody by emergency protective order on July 17, 2023.

At removal, Mother admitted methamphetamine use. Child had not received medical care since six weeks of age. DCS found the home cluttered and in disrepair. The juvenile court later adjudicated Child dependent and neglected.

DCS developed multiple permanency plans intended to reunify Mother with Child. DCS offered homemaker services, housing assistance, and intensive outpatient drug treatment. Mother was required to complete assessments, submit to random drug screens, maintain safe and stable housing, secure income, pay support, and maintain transportation.

Mother initially made progress. She completed assessments, engaged in treatment, completed parenting classes, paid child support, obtained employment, and progressed to supervised and then extended unsupervised visits.

Mother’s progress deteriorated after she voluntarily left the supportive living center because she found the program requirements too difficult to maintain. Although DCS helped Mother complete housing applications, Mother did not submit the paperwork. Instead, Mother returned to the same home from which Child had been removed, a home Mother acknowledged was inappropriate because of active drug use and criminal histories in the household.

Mother relapsed in July 2024, tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, stopped engaging with DCS services, missed or failed later drug screens, lost visitation, and did not see Child after July 2024 because she could not provide two consecutive clean drug screens.

DCS filed the termination petition on July 15, 2025. Mother re-enrolled in outpatient treatment later that month and admitted using methamphetamine on the day she re-entered treatment. She later passed methamphetamine screens but continued testing positive for THC.

By the October 14, 2025 trial, Mother had paid support arrears and claimed a recent housing application, but she still lived in her parents’ home.

The trial court found five grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found termination was in Child’s best interest. In its best-interest analysis, the trial court found eight factors to be “neutral” based on DCS’s failure to plead them.

Mother appealed only the best-interest determination, not the statutory grounds.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the statutory grounds for termination but vacated the best-interest determination and remanded because the trial court refused to consider eight statutory best-interest factors based on DCS’s perceived pleading deficiency.

Tennessee law requires termination petitioners to prove both a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in Child’s best interest. Both must be established by clear and convincing evidence, meaning evidence sufficient to create a firm belief or conviction and eliminate serious or substantial doubt.

The best-interest facts are proven by a preponderance of the evidence and then weighed collectively to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports termination. The analysis is child-centered, individualized, and not a mere counting exercise.

Tennessee law requires the court to consider the 20 best-interest factors enumerated in TCA § 36-1-113(i). The trial court made findings on twelve factors and found eleven favored termination, with one, Mother’s payment of support, weighing against termination. The trial court treated eight factors as neutral only because DCS had not pleaded them. The Court of Appeals held that was an improper basis for declining to consider them.

07The Court of Appeals concluded it was unable to determine whether the trial court considered each of the statutory factors and how it considered the proof presented relative to the factors:

The trial court can certainly consider how evidentiary deficiencies impact certain factors in a particular case or conclude that a particular factor is not relevant given the circumstances of a particular case…. DCS may argue a factor or factors are not relevant in a particular case, but the trial court must make its own determination as to relevancy in the particular case—not decline to consider the factor because it was not pleaded.

Errors may occur in a trial court’s reasoning as to a particular factor or factors without posing any significant challenge to the ultimate resolution as to the best interest of the child. However, given the sheer breadth of the number of factors not considered in determining whether to terminate parental rights and the improper basis for declining to consider these factors, we conclude that the more prudent course in the present case is to remand. This will allow the trial court to consider the twenty statutorily specified best-interest factors when making a determination in accordance with TCA § 36-1-113(i). On remand both DCS and Mother should have an opportunity to present evidence addressing the factors A, B, F, G, H, M, N, and O as well as any other relevant child-centered factor applicable to the case before the court and not previously passed upon by the court. The trial court should then make appropriate findings as to these factors.

Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated the best-interest determination and remanded for the trial court to consider all relevant factors, make appropriate findings, and determine whether termination is in Child’s best interest.

K.O.’s Comment: This opinion is a reminder that the best-interest statute is not a pleading trap.

DCS may argue that a factor is irrelevant. DCS may argue that the proof on a factor is weak. A trial court may agree. But the trial court must make that decision based on the evidence and circumstances, not because the petitioner failed to plead a factor.

That distinction matters because termination cases require individualized, child-centered decision-making. The best-interest analysis is not a checklist, and it is not a scoreboard. It is a holistic assessment of whether termination is best for this child in this family under these facts.

Source: In re Mercury H. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, July 1, 2026).

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