Facts: Mother and Father lost custody of their eighteen-month-old son in February 2022 after a domestic violence incident led to both parents’ arrest. With both parents incarcerated and without stable housing, the juvenile court declared Child dependent and neglected and placed him with Father’s aunt and uncle.

Mother was initially allowed supervised visits, but by summer 2022 she was failing drug tests and had no stable home or income. She moved out of state to live with relatives in mid-2022. Her last in-person visit with Child was in August 2022, on his second birthday. After that, Mother’s contact was limited to a few sporadic phone and video calls.

In November 2023, Child’s paternal grandfather and his wife obtained legal custody of Child. In July 2024, they petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights so they could adopt Child. They alleged several grounds, including abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.

Father did not oppose the petition, and his parental rights were terminated.

After a trial in mid-2025, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on two grounds, abandonment by failure to visit and persistence of conditions, and found that termination was in Child’s best interest. The trial court did not find clear and convincing evidence of the failure-to-manifest ground.

Mother appealed. Petitioners cross-appealed the trial court’s rejection of the failure-to-manifest ground.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The Court also reversed the trial court’s ruling on the failure-to-manifest ground, finding that Petitioners had proven it by clear and convincing evidence.

In Tennessee, parental rights may be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

One statutory ground applies when a parent “has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child.”

The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that this ground imposes a conjunctive obligation. A parent must show both an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. Thus, proof that the parent lacks either ability or willingness satisfies the first part of the ground.

The petitioner must also prove that placing the child in the parent’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological welfare. Substantial harm means a real and significant danger, not a theoretical possibility.

07The Court of Appeals held the evidence proved both parts of this ground, stating:

Respecting the first prong, Petitioners argue that Mother had “never shown an ability to resume custody of the [C]hild,” having spent the Child’s “entire childhood failing to keep stable housing, employment or transportation resources.” Petitioners point to Mother’s own admission that she “suffered from debilitating untreated mental health conditions and only began treatment for them during the pendency of this action.” Petitioners also contend that Mother demonstrated a lack of willingness to assume legal custody when she relocated to Michigan after the Child’s removal “without completing steps necessary to regain legal custody” of the Child, failing to seek formal visitation with the Child until after the Termination Petition was filed, and failing to visit in-person with the Child at any time after August 2022. Based upon these facts [], we agree that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Mother failed to manifest both an ability and a willingness to assume physical and legal custody of the Child.

Moving to the second prong—whether returning the Child to Mother’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare—Petitioners urge that a “reasonable person would be justified in foreseeing substantial harm” to the Child were he to be placed in Mother’s custody….

We note that at the time of the termination trial in June and July 2025, the Child had not resided with or had in-person contact with Mother for almost 3 years. The most recent contact between Mother and the Child was a video call that occurred in April 2024, 14 months before the first day of trial. Meanwhile, the Child had bonded with Petitioners and their children, extended family, and community. Mother lamented during her testimony that the Child knew her only as “some lady,” whereas, by contrast, the Child had grown attached to Petitioners, calling them “mom” and “dad.” Testimony established that the Child was active in church in sports, engaged in learning at a Head Start program, participated in important occupational and speech therapy sessions, and had bonded with his foster-siblings. Petitioners expressed their love for the Child and their hopes to adopt him someday.

This Court has previously determined that removing a child who has “bonded and thrived” with his or her current family to return the child to a parent with whom the child does not have a bond amounts to substantial harm. In the case at bar, the Child was only 18 months old when he was removed into protective custody, and by the time of trial, he did not consider Mother a parental figure or even appear to know who she was….

For the above-stated reasons, we determine that the Child would likely suffer substantial harm if removed from the care of Petitioners, with whom he has resided for years and established an enduring bond.

For these reasons, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody and financial responsibility for the child. The termination of Mother’s parental rights was affirmed.

K.O.’s Comment: Private termination and adoption cases often rise or fall on the timeline. Here, Mother had some positive facts. She left the abusive relationship. She obtained housing. She obtained employment. She claimed improvement with sobriety. In many cases, those facts matter. But timing matters, too.

Tennessee courts often say late progress does not carry the same weight as sustained progress made when reunification is still realistic. That is the practical meaning of “too little, too late.” A parent who waits until after the termination petition is filed to begin addressing the problems may have improved, but the child may already have moved on psychologically.

That does not mean late progress is irrelevant. In some cases, Tennessee courts have declined to terminate parental rights when rehabilitation is meaningful, timely, and paired with consistent contact. The difference is usually not whether the parent eventually did something helpful. The difference is whether the parent acted soon enough and consistently enough to preserve the parent-child relationship.

The most damaging fact here may have been Mother’s own admission that Child knew her only as “some lady.” Once that becomes the record, the substantial-harm analysis becomes very difficult for the parent.

Source: In re Alexander B. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, June 3, 2026).

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