Facts: Mother and Father were never married and lived in different cities when Child was conceived in 2015. Mother quickly decided to place Child for adoption with Guardians, but Father objected from the beginning and sought custody. Father took the steps available to establish and protect his parental rights. He registered with the Ohio putative father registry, prepared space in his home, offered financial support, and filed a petition to establish paternity.

After Child’s birth, Mother and Guardians sought to terminate Father’s parental rights in Ohio. That litigation lasted two years, during which Father had no contact with Child. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Father’s favor and denied termination.

Mother and Guardians then sought to terminate Father’s parental rights in Florida. The Florida court denied the termination in 2019, finding that Mother and Guardians had “continuously frustrated [Father’s] attempts to parent his child,” while Father had “jumped over every hurdle put in front of him.”

Mother next sought permission to relocate to Tennessee, stating that the move would “allow Mother to parent [Child] in a more meaningful manner.” The Florida court granted permission. Two weeks later, Guardians filed another termination petition in Tennessee, with Mother’s written consent to adoption.

The Tennessee trial court denied termination in 2022, finding that Father’s failure to support was not willful. When Father then sought parenting time, Mother and Guardians filed motions to stay the custody proceedings and filed another termination petition in chancery court. The juvenile court stayed the custody proceedings while the new termination petition was pending.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of termination in October 2023, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review in January 2024.

After the second Tennessee termination petition was dismissed in August 2024, Guardians immediately filed a petition for dependency and neglect and for guardianship. That same day, Father and the guardian ad litem filed an emergency motion to place Child in Father’s custody, attaching declarations from the court-appointed psychologist concluding that Child was “being significantly psychologically abused by [the Guardians]” and that their continued custody would cause substantial harm.

The trial court held a three-day hearing in December 2024. Father presented evidence of his stable home, steady employment, family support, and the strong emotional bond he had developed with Child during supervised and unsupervised visits.

The court-appointed psychologist testified that she spent more than 30 hours observing Father and Child. She concluded that Father had a stronger parent-child bond with Child than Mother did. She also testified that Mother engaged in “blatant parental alienation.”

Mother testified that she moved to Tennessee in January 2021, purportedly to provide primary care, but never did so. She later returned to Florida. Since then, she has visited Child 30 to 40 days per year, stayed with Guardians during visits, and has never had an overnight visit with Child alone.

Mother acknowledged that she did not have a parent-child relationship with Child.

The trial court named Father the primary residential parent, awarded him sole decision-making authority, and granted Mother 18 days of parenting time per year.

Mother appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s parenting plan and awarded Father attorney’s fees on appeal.

Mother first argued the trial court violated due process by extending the hearing into the evening of the third day. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because Mother did not preserve it. Although Mother’s counsel mentioned being tired, she did not object to continuing the proof, move for a continuance, or identify any additional evidence she was unable to present. Mother’s counsel specifically stated she was “ready to go” and would “push through,” and delivered her closing argument at approximately 9:45 p.m. The Court found no reversible error.

Mother next challenged the trial court’s decision limiting her parenting time to 18 days per year. She argued that Tennessee law favors maximum participation by both parents.

The Court agreed that Tennessee law generally favors reasonable parenting time, but it explained that TCA § 36-6-406 authorizes courts to restrict parenting time when a parent’s conduct adversely affects the child’s best interests.

The trial court found that three statutory limiting factors applied to Mother: substantial nonperformance of parenting responsibilities, substantial impairment of emotional ties between Mother and Child, and the abusive use of conflict, creating a danger to Child’s psychological development.

Regarding the limitation on Mother’s parenting time, the trial court identified three limiting factors under TCA § 36-6-406(d): neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting responsibilities, the absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between Mother and Child, and the abusive use of conflict that created a danger of damage to Child’s psychological development. Mother argued that such a restriction could be imposed only under “extreme circumstances.” The Court was unpersuaded:

[T]he trial court found Mother has never demonstrated a desire to parent the child. The trial court was especially concerned that even on the eve of the court-ordered change in custody in incredibly difficult circumstances of this case for [Child], Mother still had failed to make any attempt to step into the role of a parent. Instead of helping with this extremely difficult transition, Mother had elected to travel. The trial court concluded that, while declining to take necessary actions to step forward in parenting [Child], Mother continued to interfere with Father’s attempts to parent, and she has deprived Father of the care and custody of his child.

The Court also relied on the expert testimony that Mother engaged in parental alienation and that Mother’s contact should be substantially limited.

The trial court found persuasive [the psychologist’s] testimony that Mother had engaged in parental alienation and [the psychologist’s] recommendation that contact with Mother should be limited.

The Court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to award Mother minimal parenting time.

On the primary residential parent designation, the Court conducted a comparative fitness analysis under TCA § 36-6-106(a) and found the trial court’s extensive findings well supported:

[I]t is apparent that Father has, from the time of [Child]’s birth, done everything possible to prepare to parent his child. . . . He has done this despite barriers being erected by Mother and the Guardians, including Mother’s false representation to the school that he had no parental rights. Mother, on the other hand, has demonstrated that her role is that of a willing occasional playmate and family friend to [Child]. She has never kept him overnight, although she has had relatively free access to him due to her close relationship with the Guardians. Mother’s expenditures demonstrate that she has not spent significant time in Tennessee with [Child], even as the inevitable change in custody drew near; in fact, she spent the bulk of the month of November out of the country rather than staying near [Child] to try to acclimate him to her having a larger role in his life.

The Court acknowledged that the trial court’s order was deficient for failing to expressly address TCA § 36-6-407 regarding sole decision-making authority. Still, the Court affirmed, finding that the extensive findings enabled it to understand the basis of the decision and conclude that there was no error. The Court also affirmed the denial of Mother’s motion to alter or amend the child support calculation and awarded Father attorney’s fees on appeal under TCA § 36-5-103(c), remanding for a determination of the appropriate amount.

K.O.’s Comment: The trial court found Mother repeatedly used litigation and misrepresentations to obstruct Father’s parental rights after courts in multiple states refused to terminate them.

A parent may genuinely believe another placement is best for the child. But once courts reject that position, continuing to litigate the same objective while refusing to support the child’s relationship with the other parent can become evidence against that parent in the custody analysis.

The parenting-time issue is also a useful reminder that “maximum participation” is not a trump card. Sustained obstruction, impaired emotional ties, and abusive use of conflict can justify severe restrictions when supported by specific findings. The Court of Appeals did not say 18 days per year is typical. It said this record was extreme enough to support it.

Regarding the due process issue, I once had a trial where most of the witnesses were from another state. Late in the day, rather than continuing the trial to another day, the Chancellor said we would stay until the trial was finished. My recollection is that I left the courthouse around 10:30 p.m. and had an hour-long drive to get home. No breaks. No dinner. It’s rare, but this happens sometimes.

Source: Chapman v. Wade (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, May 21, 2026).

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