Facts: Mother and Father, the parents of Child, divorced in October 2021. Their agreed Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”) designated Father as the Child’s primary residential parent, with approximately 234 days of parenting time to Father and 131 days to Mother. The PPP provided for joint decision-making on major issues (education, non-emergency healthcare, religious upbringing, extracurriculars) while each parent handled day-to-day decisions when the Child was in their care. Father was also responsible for maintaining health and dental insurance for Child.

A little over a year after the divorce, Mother petitioned to modify the parenting plan to change custody and reverse the schedule such that she would have 234 days and Father would have 131. Mother alleged several material changes in circumstance had occurred, including that Father sold the marital home and moved, failed to communicate with her about Child’s well-being, interfered with her parenting time, and allowed Child’s paternal grandmother to interfere with Mother’s relationship with Child.

Father denied all of Mother’s allegations in his answer to the petition.

The trial court held a two-day trial. Mother testified, as did Child’s maternal grandmother and Mother’s friend. Father did not testify, choosing instead to move for an involuntary dismissal under TRCP 41 at the close of Mother’s proof. The trial court granted Father’s motion and dismissed Mother’s petition with prejudice, finding that Mother had not carried her burden of proving a material change of circumstance affecting the Child’s well-being.

In its ruling, the trial court found that Mother’s expectations about the level of communication she should receive were “not reasonable” and concluded that, contrary to Mother’s claims, the parties had been successfully co-parenting under the existing plan. Neither parent had denied visitation or bad-mouthed the other, and both had cooperated in accommodating schedule changes. The trial court determined that none of Mother’s complaints, e.g., Father’s moves, alleged communication issues, purported denial of parenting time, or family interference, amounted to a material change impacting Child. Because Mother failed to establish the threshold of a material change in circumstance, the court did not reach the best-interest analysis and dismissed the petition.

The trial court also awarded Father his attorneys’ fees ($15,130) as the prevailing party under TCA § 36-5-103(c). Mother appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mother’s petition, agreeing that no material change had been proven.

In Tennessee, a parent who seeks to modify a custody or primary-residential-parent designation must first prove “a material change in circumstance” by a preponderance of the evidence. TCA § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) provides that no showing of substantial harm to the child is required; a material change can include a parent’s failure to adhere to the parenting plan or any development that makes the current plan no longer in the child’s best interest.

Tennessee courts follow a two-step analysis for custody modifications: the threshold question is whether a material change of circumstances has arisen since the prior order. Only if a material change is found does the court proceed to determine whether altering the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest.

Tennessee courts have deliberately avoided defining a strict formula for what constitutes a “material” change sufficient to change custody, as Mother proposed, because each case depends on its own facts. However, general guiding principles exist: the change must involve either the child’s circumstances or a parent’s circumstances that affect the child’s well-being, must have arisen after the entry of the prior custody order, must not have been reasonably anticipated when that order was entered, and must affect the child in a meaningful way. If the alleged change fails to meet these criteria—particularly if it does not impact the child’s well-being—then it will not justify a change of custody.

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that Mother did not prove a material change in circumstance sufficient to warrant modifying the parenting plan, explaining:

Upon review, we determine that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s conclusion that Father had sufficiently communicated with Mother concerning the Child’s healthcare.

As to Father’s purported failure to provide Mother with the Child’s health insurance card and medical bills, the trial court found that the evidence did not support Mother’s assertion that Father had not provided these items. Regarding the health insurance card, the trial court referenced a text message from Father stating that he was “sending Mother the insurance card” and noted that Mother had not provided any evidence to contradict this statement. Regarding Father’s purported failure to “provide medical bills,” the court found there was “no proof” of any such failure and that in any case the PPP did not require Father to provide the Child’s medical bills to Mother. The court thus determined that even if Mother had proven that Father had failed to provide Mother with the Child’s medical bills, such failure was not a violation of the PPP and did not warrant modification. The evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s determinations regarding the health insurance card and the medical bills.

With respect to Father’s 2022 and 2023 tax documents, it was undisputed that Father did not provide those documents to Mother. However, the trial court determined that Father’s failure to provide them was not “material” because it did not “have any effect on the well-being of the [Child].” We agree with the trial court. As stated above, a material change in circumstance warranting a change in custody must involve either the child’s circumstances or a parent’s circumstances that affect the child’s well-being. Father’s failure to provide Mother with his 2022 and 2023 tax documents, standing alone, does not constitute a material change in circumstance affecting the Child’s well-being. Therefore, Mother’s postulate on this point is unavailing.

*      *     *     *     *

In the case at bar, however, Mother did not present any evidence that either parent’s change of residence had affected the Child. Although Mother provided photographs of her new home, which the trial court deemed to be “very nice,” there was no evidence regarding how Mother’s new home affected the Child’s well-being. Similarly, there was a dearth of evidence establishing that Father’s move to a new home had affected the Child’s well-being. Ergo, Mother’s and Father’s respective changes of residence did not constitute “a material change of circumstance affecting the child’s best interest.”

The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

K.O.’s Comment: Here, Mother had plenty of complaints but little evidence that any of her concerns were truly affecting the child. Minor parenting squabbles, ordinary life changes, or a co-parent’s irritating habits won’t suffice if the child is doing well. Before dragging a co-parent back to court, parents should ensure they have solid evidence of a real change that impacts the child’s well-being. Failing that, as this case shows, the attempt will likely not only fail but could also leave them on the hook for the other side’s attorney’s fees.

Source: Lannom v. Lannom (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, April 9, 2026).

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