Facts: In 2016, Mother and Father had a child but never married. The child lived with Mother her entire life. Mother testified that Father was largely uninvolved with the child even when they lived together, prioritizing partying and video games over parenting. The parents’ on-and-off relationship ended for good in late 2018 when Father was investigated for a sexual offense against a minor unrelated to this case, after which Mother refused to allow him contact with the child.

Mother and Father’s early separation was followed by Father’s legal troubles. He pleaded guilty to a felony sex offense in November 2018 and was incarcerated from March 2020 until July 2023. From approximately April 2020 to June 2023, Father sent around thirty letters to the child from prison. The letters, which Mother found inappropriate for a young child, went unanswered.

Upon his release on parole in July 2023, Father moved into a halfway house in Texas and could not leave the state without permission. Father obtained a job earning over $18 per hour and added the child to his employer-provided health insurance. Because Mother had blocked Father on social media due to his history of domestic violence and the nature of his crime, Father’s post-release attempts to contact Mother via private social media messages never reached her. Mother later testified that even if she had received Father’s messages, she would not have responded or allowed Father to contact the child.

The State of Tennessee had previously instituted a child support action in 2017. By agreed order entered in December 2017, Father was required to provide health insurance for the child (if available through employment) and pay half of any uninsured medical or dental expenses. The issue of monthly child support was expressly reserved for future determination.

Father made two deposits into Mother’s bank account after the 2017 order, but Mother soon closed that account, telling Father she didn’t need his “bribe money.” After September 2018, Father provided no financial support for the child. At the time of trial, Father’s net income left him with a monthly surplus of roughly $1,500, yet he still paid nothing to support the child beyond maintaining health insurance coverage.

Mother and her new husband, Stepfather, filed a petition on February 9, 2024, to terminate Father’s parental rights so Stepfather could adopt the child. They alleged Father abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and willfully failing to support her during the four-month period preceding the petition. They also alleged that terminating Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest.

Father retained counsel and filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting that any failure to visit or support was not willful.

At trial in December 2024, Mother, Father, and Stepfather testified. Father admitted he had not seen the child in person since September 2018 (aside from a video chat in April 2019) and had not requested visitation through the court system. He explained that he could not travel outside Texas while on parole and that Mother had cut off all communication with him. Father said he had saved money and contacted an attorney in Tennessee to file for custody in early 2024, shortly before being served with the termination petition.

Regarding support, Father acknowledged that he did not provide any monetary support after 2018. He believed he had fulfilled his obligations under the 2017 agreed order by keeping the child on his health insurance after his release from prison.

In February 2025, the trial court entered a detailed order denying the termination petition. The trial court found that Petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination.

First, although Father made no in-person visits during the relevant four-month period, the trial court found his failure to visit was not willful. It credited Father’s testimony that he was unable to see the child because of Mother’s refusal to communicate or cooperate, his parole-related travel restrictions, and his lack of funds to immediately initiate legal proceedings.

Second, the court found Father had not failed to support the child during the statutory period. By complying with the 2017 order’s insurance provision, Father had “met his legal obligation to support the child,” and the court treated the reserved child support as excusing any further payments.

Because no ground for termination was proven, the trial court declined to terminate Father’s parental rights. In anticipation of a possible appeal, the trial court considered the child’s best interests and found that nearly all the statutory best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination of Father’s rights. Despite noting that termination of Father’s parental rights would greatly benefit the child, the trial court concluded it was bound to deny the petition since Mother and Stepfather failed to prove a ground for termination.

Mother and Stepfather appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding no grounds for termination.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Father’s failure to visit the child was not willful, reversed the trial court’s finding that Father did not willfully fail to support the child and held that terminating Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

Tennessee law requires a two-step analysis for terminating parental rights.

First, at least one statutory ground for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. One statutory ground for termination is abandonment, which is defined to include a parent’s failure to visit or failure to support the child during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition.

“Failure to visit” means no visits or only token visitation during that period, and “failure to support” means failing to provide monetary support or only making token payments toward the child’s support.

A parent may assert an affirmative defense that the failure to visit or support was not willful but bears the burden of proving lack of willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence. Willfulness in this context does not require ill will or malevolence; it means the failure to perform a duty was intentional, not due to outside forces or obstacles.

Tennessee courts recognize that a parent’s failure to visit is not willful if it is “thwarted by the acts of others,” such as when the custodial parent blocks or significantly hinders the visiting parent’s efforts to see the child.

Second, if a ground for termination is established, the court must determine whether terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest. This analysis is made from the child’s perspective and involves numerous statutory factors, including the child’s need for a stable home, the parent’s fitness and efforts to support or contact the child, and the strength of the child’s bond with the current caregivers.

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that although Father’s failure to visit was not willful, his failure to support the child was willful, and that terminating Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest:

Moreover, while Mother points to other channels that Father could have used to contact her, she testified that no matter how he contacted her, she likely would not have permitted him to have contact with the child. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Father proved the defense of lack of willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence in relation to the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.

*     *     *     *     *

If Father had attempted even a single time in the four-month period to send support via mail to Mother that she refused to accept, this result may have been different. But Father simply made no effort to do that, believing that his only obligation was to place the child on his employer-provided insurance. But his obligation to support his child went beyond that meager offering. Thus, while it does appear that Father placed the child on his health insurance during the relevant time, we conclude that this effort was merely token, given his means. As a result, the trial court erred in finding that [Mother and Stepfather] did not prove this ground for termination.

Thus, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part. In the end, Father’s parental rights were terminated.

K.O.’s Comment: This decision emphasizes that every parent has a duty to support their child financially, even if no court order spells out the amount. Tennessee law presumes that parents know they must support their children. A prior court order that “reserves” child support (or a complete absence of any support order) does not excuse a parent from providing for their child’s needs. The Court of Appeals made it clear that providing only token support, e.g., merely keeping a child on an insurance policy while paying nothing toward her daily needs, is insufficient when the parent can do more. Father’s belief that he was “covered” because of the 2017 agreed order was a costly mistake; it supplied the very ground needed to sever his parental rights.

Lawyers should note that there is currently some disagreement in the appellate courts on this issue: in a recent case, In re Nathaniel D., the Court of Appeals majority declined to follow In re Kiara C.’s reasoning that a court order reserving child support does not relieve a parent of their independent statutory duty to provide more than token support for their child, although Nathaniel D. was designated a Memorandum Opinion and is not citable precedent. The Tennessee Supreme Court has granted review in In re Nathaniel D. on February 26, 2026, so we may soon have clarity. Until then, the safe practice for any parent is to provide actual financial support for their child, court order or not.

Source: In re Evalina H. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, April 6, 2026).

If you find this helpful, please share it using the buttons below.