Facts: This post summarizes two separate appellate opinions that were companion cases both in the trial court and on appeal.

Mr. Armitage was romantically involved with two women—Ms. Hale and Ms. Kasulis—at the same time. Each woman believed she was in an exclusive relationship with Mr. Armitage and was unaware of the other. When Ms. Hale and Ms. Kasulis discovered Mr. Armitage’s infidelity, they were very upset and decided to confront him together.

Under the pretense of needing help with her computer, Ms. Hale brought Mr. Armitage to her home. Once inside, Ms. Hale revealed Ms. Kasulis’s presence. The two women then confronted Mr. Armitage for approximately twenty minutes. A third woman was present to record parts of the encounter on video and audio.

During this confrontation, the women expressed how hurt they were by Mr. Armitage’s deception and the risks his dishonesty had exposed them to. They also made threats toward Mr. Armitage. The threats Mr. Armitage found “most terrifying” were the women’s statements that they would expose his behavior to his family, friends, and employer. He also claimed the women made physical threats.

At one point, Ms. Kasulis told Mr. Armitage he had put her life in danger due to her health conditions. Ms. Hale added, “Put his own life in danger, because when [a third party] ever comes home and sees him in public, it’s going to be on sight.”

The women mentioned that their family members might harm him upon learning of his actions. Ms. Hale even said, “We could fix the beating tonight if you wanted to,” and warned Mr. Armitage to hope he never encountered her family or the other person in public. Ms. Hale noted her father was kind enough not to “beat the living shit” out of Mr. Armitage, and Ms. Kasulis remarked that her father might not be so restrained.

Mr. Armitage testified that he felt he could not leave Ms. Hale’s home during the confrontation. He said Ms. Kasulis stood in front of the door while Ms. Hale stood to his side, blocking other exits. However, Mr. Armitage admitted he never tried to leave, was never explicitly told he couldn’t leave, and he had his phone in hand the entire time (though he didn’t call for help).

The confrontation ended when Ms. Kasulis asked if he “really want[ed] to keep doing this,” and Mr. Armitage said no. Ms. Kasulis then said, “Then there’s the door,” allowing him to leave. Mr. Armitage walked out and called his parents to pick him up.

After leaving the house, Mr. Armitage saw Ms. Hale, Ms. Kasulis, and the third woman drive by, which prompted him to change his walking route. While he waited at an intersection for his parents, Ms. Hale pulled up alone in her car and demanded that he get in. Mr. Armitage refused, but Ms. Hale persisted, then sped off. Moments later, she returned, parked, and again insisted he get in her car. Mr. Armitage walked away, at which point he heard keys jingling and saw Ms. Hale running toward him. Mr. Armitage ran and managed to reach his parents’ just-arriving car to escape. A brief audio recording captured part of this chase, including Ms. Hale’s demands that he get in her car so she could “get [him] home.”

Both women effectively cut off contact with Mr. Armitage after that night. Ms. Kasulis told him during the confrontation that he would never see her again. Following the incident, Ms. Hale sent Mr. Armitage a text saying she was “blocking” him, indicating she wanted nothing more to do with him. Mr. Armitage confirmed that neither Ms. Hale nor Ms. Kasulis contacted him at all after that night.

In the days that followed, Mr. Armitage filed for orders of protection against Ms. Hale and Ms. Kasulis.

The trial court reviewed his petitions and granted an ex parte order of protection against Ms. Hale, i.e., a temporary order protecting Mr. Armitage from Ms. Hale without first hearing Ms. Hale’s side. However, the trial court denied an ex parte order of protection against Ms. Kasulis, so no immediate order was issued against her. Both cases were set for a single contested hearing in the trial court to determine whether a one-year order of protection should be issued.

At the joint hearing, the trial court heard the evidence described above. The judge made several findings. He found that Mr. Armitage had been brought to Ms. Hale’s house under false pretenses and that Ms. Hale and Ms. Kasulis had indeed intended to intimidate him during the confrontation. On whether Mr. Armitage had been restrained, the judge commented that while neither woman was physically imposing on her own, together they did effectively hold Mr. Armitage against his will “until they had their say.” The judge noted that Mr. Armitage would have had to risk a physical altercation to push past them to leave. The trial court essentially found that Mr. Armitage was detained in the house until the women allowed him to go.

Regarding Ms. Hale’s actions, the trial court observed that after Mr. Armitage left the house and clearly expressed he wanted no further interaction, Ms. Hale actively pursued him with her car. The judge said he “arguably” would grant an order of protection against Ms. Hale largely because of that pursuit and chase after Mr. Armitage tried to walk away. The court was less sure about Ms. Kasulis, calling her part in physically holding him a “tighter case,” i.e., a closer call.

In the end, the trial court did not issue a one-year order of protection against either woman. Notably, the judge did not make a clear finding on whether Mr. Armitage had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that either Ms. Hale or Ms. Kasulis committed “domestic abuse” or another qualifying offense.

Instead, the judge decided the cases based on a different consideration: whether Mr. Armitage faced an ongoing, present danger from Ms. Hale or Ms. Kasulis. The judge concluded that there was no “ongoing existing danger” to Mr. Armitage from either woman. He pointed out that Mr. Armitage and the two women did not work together, attend school together, or live near each other, and that the women had not tried to contact or bother him since the night of the confrontation. The only remaining “threat” Mr. Armitage had raised was the women’s threat to tell others about what he did, which the judge said could not justify an order of protection because it would amount to an impermissible prior restraint on speech.

The trial judge acknowledged that his approach—requiring proof of an ongoing danger—seemed in tension with the language of the protective order statute. However, the judge believed his approach was supported by an earlier Court of Appeals decision in Dulaney v. Chico, a 2023 case. He interpreted Dulaney v. Chico as allowing a court to deny an order of protection if it finds no continuing threat, even if the statutory requirements for an order, e.g., proof of abuse, are met. In fact, the same trial judge had been the trial judge in the Dulaney case, and in that case his similar decision to deny an order of protection had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Relying on his understanding of that precedent, the trial judge ruled that, due to the lack of ongoing danger, Mr. Armitage’s petitions would be dismissed. The ex parte order against Ms. Hale was dissolved rather than extended, and no order was issued against Ms. Kasulis.

Mr. Armitage appealed both decisions, which were heard together as companion cases by the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Armitage’s petition against Ms. Hale but affirmed the dismissal of his petition against Ms. Kasulis.

The two appeals yielded opposite results because of a key legal difference between the cases: the presence of an ex parte order of protection in the Hale case versus its absence in the Kasulis case.

When a person petitions for an order of protection, a court may issue an ex parte order immediately, i.e., a temporary order issued without the judge hearing from the other side, if there’s an “immediate and present danger of abuse” to the petitioner. When an ex parte order of protection is issued, a full hearing must then occur within 15 days.

At that hearing, Tennessee law requires that the issuing court “shall” either dissolve the ex parte order of protection or, if the petitioner has proven the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, the court “shall” extend the order of protection for up to one year.

In contrast, if no ex parte order of protection was in place before the hearing, Tennessee law says the issuing court “may” issue a one-year order of protection if the petitioner proves the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

In other words, Tennessee’s order of protection statute uses mandatory language (“shall”) when extending a previously issued ex parte order, but permissive language (“may”) when no ex parte order was issued at the outset.

Tennessee courts interpret “shall” as a mandatory directive and “may” as giving the trial court discretion. Thus, under the statute, if an ex parte order was granted and the petitioner proves the abuse occurred, the trial court arguably has no discretion; it must extend the order. If no ex parte order was granted, even if abuse is proven, the court has discretion to decide whether to issue an order of protection at the hearing.

Tennessee also has a statute—TCA § 36-3-618—stating that the purpose and legislative intent of the order of protection statutes is to “protect the victim and prevent further harm to the victim.”

But, as explained above, in Dulaney v. Chico, the Court of Appeals interpreted this to mean that an order of protection is proper only where there is sufficient evidence that the victim needs the protection available, i.e., that there is proof of an “ongoing, present danger.”

The majority held that when an ex parte order of protection has been issued (as in the Hale matter), the law leaves no room for the trial court to require any additional element like “ongoing danger”; the court must extend the order if the underlying abuse is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. However, when no ex parte order was issued (as in the Kasulis matter), the trial court has discretion and may consider the lack of an ongoing threat as a valid reason to deny issuance of a new order of protection. The majority explained its reasoning in the Hale matter:

[W]e agree with the trial court’s assessment that the statute contains a “shall issue” command that is tension with the opinion of this court in Dulaney v. Chico. 

We ultimately conclude that the statutory language mandates extending an order of protection when an ex parte order has been issued and the predicate of domestic abuse is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, … our reading of the statute, respectfully, diverges from Dulaney v. Chico, and we conclude that the case should be remanded to determine whether Mr. Armitage proved the underlying predicate offense.

In the Kasulis case, the majority then explained why the outcome was different from that in Hale:

We ultimately conclude that while the statutory language mandates extending an already issued ex parte order of protection when the predicate offense is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the statutory scheme does not mandate issuance of an order of protection where no ex parte order of protection had been issued. Though our reading of the statute, respectfully, diverges from that in Dulaney v. Chico, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court’s decision to decline to issue an order of protection as to Ms. Kasulis should be affirmed.

So, in the Hale case, the majority found that the trial judge was wrong to treat the ex parte order as optional to extend. They interpret the law to require extending that order if Mr. Armitage proved a qualifying act of abuse by Ms. Hale. The trial court had never explicitly decided whether Ms. Hale’s actions met the definition of “domestic abuse” by a preponderance of evidence, because the judge ended the inquiry after finding no ongoing danger. The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of Mr. Armitage’s petition against Ms. Hale and sent the case back for the trial court to determine whether Mr. Armitage proved that Ms. Hale committed domestic abuse. If so, the law requires that the ex parte order of protection be extended, regardless of whether Ms. Hale was likely to bother Mr. Armitage again in the future.

For the Kasulis case, the Court held that because no ex parte order was issued initially against Ms. Kasulis, the trial court retained discretion at the hearing. The Court ruled that considering the absence of an ongoing threat to Mr. Armitage was a proper exercise of that discretion. Given that Ms. Kasulis had not contacted Mr. Armitage again or continued any harassing behavior after the confrontation, the trial court reasonably concluded that an order of protection was not necessary. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition against Ms. Kasulis.

Dissenting/Concurring Opinion: Judge McClarty issued a dissenting opinion in the Hale case, where he would have upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Armitage’s petition against Ms. Hale. He views the order of protection statutes “as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.” Judge McClarty argued that the purpose of the order of protection statutes is to protect victims and prevent further harm, and that an order of protection should issue “only where there is sufficient evidence that the victim needs the protection.” He noted that after the confrontation, Mr. Armitage was not contacted by either woman and effectively faced no continuing threat. In Judge McClarty’s view, the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Armitage did not need an ongoing protective order under these circumstances.

I believe a careful reading of Chico establishes that this court did not add an additional element to the order of protection statutes as argued by [Mr. Armitage]… Rather, the panel in Chico considered the legislative purpose of the order of protection statutes before ultimately determining that the plaintiff was not in need of the protection afforded by the order of protection statutes.… In deference to this legislative intent under these circumstances, I would likewise conclude that there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Mr. Armitage] needed the protection available. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Using the same reasoning quoted above, Judge McClarty issued an opinion in the Kasulis case concurring in the outcome:

In deference to this legislative intent under these circumstances, I would likewise conclude that there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Mr. Armitage] needed the protection available, regardless of whether an ex parte order of protection had been issued prior to the hearing. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

K.O.’s Comment: (1) These cases highlight a split in judicial philosophy. Judge McClarty essentially argues that an order of protection is a serious measure that creates a public record, restricts the respondent’s rights, etc., and shouldn’t be granted unless it’s actually needed to protect someone from likely future harm. This viewpoint is consistent with cases such as Autry v. Autry, 83 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), which held that an order of protection is appropriate only where the evidence shows the victim needs protection. The trial judge here was clearly influenced by that very principle.

However, the majority in these opinions steered back to a strict reading of the statutory text: “shall” means shall, and “may” means may. The result is a more formulaic application of the law. Meet the statutory elements, and you get an order if an ex parte order was in place. Otherwise, the judge has latitude to weigh factors like whether the petitioner truly needs protection going forward. They indicate that if the legislature’s words create a mandatory extension in certain cases, judges must follow that mandate, even if it potentially results in an order of protection after the danger has passed.

For lawyers, these decisions underscore a practical strategy point: if you are representing a person seeking an order of protection, securing an ex parte order upfront can be crucial. Doing so puts the case on a path where the extension of that protection is mandatory if you prove your case at the contested hearing.

(2) Both majority opinions say appeals “to the Tennessee Supreme Court may be well warranted to help provide a definitive interpretation of the statutory scheme.” If the Supreme Court grants permission to appeal, it would have been my prediction that the Court would divide along the same 3-2 split we saw in Colley, which also involved statutory interpretation. However, Justice Kirby—who wrote for the majority in Colley—announced her retirement effective June 30, 2026. Will her replacement—Justice Kyle Hixson—be the swing vote?

(3) It should be noted that Mr. Armitage was represented by law students from the UT Law Domestic Violence Clinic. First, facing a pack of motivated 3Ls is my worst nightmare. Second, congratulations to those students on a job well done! Their success underscores my argument that Tennessee’s law schools should create family law clinical programs.

(4) I made myself laugh with this post’s meme. I hope you like it as much as I do.

Source: Armitage v. Hale (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, December 29, 2025) and Armitage v. Kasulis (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, December 29, 2025). Click here for the dissenting opinion in Hale and the concurring opinion in Kasulis.

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