Spousal Joinder Snag in Morristown, Tennessee Adoption: In re Steele M.

October 16, 2025 K.O. Herston 0 Comments

Facts: Child was born in May 2022 and immediately taken into protective custody after testing positive for drugs at birth. Child’s paternal step-grandmother (“Step-Grandmother”) obtained legal and physical custody of Child through juvenile court orders. Step-Grandmother was married to Child’s paternal grandfather (“Grandfather”) at that time. Child has lived with Step-Grandmother essentially since he was eight weeks old.

From Child’s birth until mid-2023, Child’s biological father (“Father”) had no involvement. Father struggled with drug addiction and did not visit Child or provide any financial support. By July 2023, Father claimed to have turned his life around and had been sober for about 13 months, but still had not made any effort to contact or support Child.

A man wearing glasses and a winter coat stands outdoors, emphasizing the importance of having a spouse join an adoption petition.

On July 19, 2023, Step-Grandmother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights and adopt Child. At that time, Step-Grandmother was still married to Grandfather, but she filed the petition alone, asserting that Grandfather was unable to participate due to dementia and other health issues. Step-Grandmother testified that Grandfather was aware of the proceedings and had notice, but she characterized him as “incompetent and not capable of attending” the court hearings. Grandfather was never named as a party or co-petitioner in the termination/adoption case.

Sometime during the litigation, Step-Grandmother filed for divorce from Grandfather.

The trial on the termination petition took place in July 2024. The proof overwhelmingly demonstrated that Father had abandoned Child by failing to visit, failing to support, failing to legitimate, and failing to demonstrate any ability to parent. Although Father had recently made personal improvements (sobriety, some employment, short parenting class), by trial he still lacked stable housing of his own or a driver’s license, and had virtually no relationship with Child. Step-Grandmother, on the other hand, had been Child’s primary caregiver since infancy; Child was thriving in her care and bonded to her as “Mommy.”

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on four grounds: abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit, failure to legitimate, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court also concluded it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights.

Notably, the trial court addressed the issue of Grandfather not joining the petition. The court expressly found that Step-Grandmother could proceed alone: it recited that “all necessary parties” were properly before the court, noted that Grandfather had notice of the proceedings, and accepted Step-Grandmother’s testimony that her husband was “incompetent and not capable of attending.” Thus, the trial court ruled that Step-Grandmother was “a proper person to go forward as a single parent adoption” and a “suitable” adoptive party.

In line with the usual practice of bifurcating these matters, the trial court did not immediately finalize the adoption; the order stated the court would “wait thirty days after entry to finalize the Adoption,” thereby giving time for the termination to become final.

Father appealed, arguing the petition was defective because Grandfather did not join as a co-petitioner.

While the appeal was pending, an interesting development occurred: the trial judge revisited the issue of Grandfather’s competence. In a sua sponte order entered in January 2025, the trial court vacated its earlier finding that Grandfather was incompetent. The judge explained that Grandfather had appeared in court in a separate divorce proceeding in late 2024 and “seemed perfectly capable” of participating. The trial court acknowledged its prior finding was “contrary to reality” and corrected the record to reflect that Grandfather was, in fact, competent. The trial court left all other findings and conclusions unchanged. This backtrack on Grandfather’s status set the stage for the appellate court’s review of whether Step-Grandmother’s petition—filed without her husband as a co-petitioner—was legally permissible.

On Appeal: The Court affirmed the grounds but vacated and remanded the best-interest portion for further findings. The Court also addressed Father’s argument about the petition being defective.

Tennessee’s adoption statutes provide that if a petitioner is married and the spouse is competent, the spouse “shall join in the petition.” In other words, a married person generally cannot adopt a child alone unless their spouse is either truly unable to participate or is Child’s other parent.

Father argued that because Step-Grandmother’s spouse did not join the petition, she was not a proper party to seek termination or adoption, rendering the entire proceeding invalid.

Step-Grandmother argued that because the trial court separated the termination of parental rights from the adoption, the joinder requirement wasn’t triggered at the termination stage. Indeed, TCA § 36-1-113(a) explicitly allows a court “to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding or as part of the adoption proceeding.” This means a termination can be decided first, with adoption to follow. That is exactly what the trial court did here: it heard the termination case first and left the adoption for a subsequent step. The question was whether that procedural bifurcation permitted Step-Grandmother to file the termination petition alone despite being married.

Join 1,884 other subscribers

The Court of Appeals held that Step-Grandmother had standing to file and prosecute the termination of Father’s rights on her own. However, the Court made clear that the adoption cannot be finalized unless and until the spousal joinder rule is satisfied. In practical terms, this means Step-Grandmother’s husband would need to formally join the adoption petition, or be legally excused from doing so, say, by divorce or a finding of incapacity, before the court could grant an adoption decree:

We agree with [Step-Grandmother] that [Grandfather] was not a required party to a proceeding to terminate [Father]’s parental rights. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s finding that [Step-Grandmother] was a proper party to bring a termination petition. However, this conclusion does not extend to [Step-Grandmother’s] request to adopt Child. Before the trial court rules on [Step-Grandmother’s] request to adopt Child, it must ensure that [Step-Grandmother] is in compliance with section 36-1-115(c).

Thus, if the termination of Father’s rights occurs after the remand for additional best-interest findings, Step-Grandmother can proceed with adopting Child only after complying with TCA § 36-1-115(c) by having Grandfather properly join as a co-petitioner or by finalizing her divorce such that she no longer needs a spouse’s signature.

K.O.’s Comment: For lawyers and prospective adoptive parents, the takeaway is don’t skip the spousal consent. If a spouse cannot or will not join the adoption petition, you need to strategize accordingly. In cases of actual incapacity, that needs to be well-documented and likely adjudicated. If a spouse is simply unwilling, an adoption probably cannot proceed at all unless that issue is resolved (perhaps the adoption would have to wait until a divorce is final, as may end up happening here).

If you file a termination petition coupled with an adoption request, and your client is married, do not treat the spouse as an afterthought. Bring them in as a co-petitioner from the start or be prepared to explain exactly why that’s not legally required.

Source: In re Steele M., No. E2024-01454-COA-R3-PT (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2025).

If you find this helpful, please share it using the buttons below.

Spousal Joinder Snag in Morristown, Tennessee Adoption: In re Steele M. was last modified: October 10th, 2025 by K.O. Herston

Leave a Comment