Facts: Mother gave birth to Child in 2016. Mother and Stepfather were together at that time and later married in 2018. Stepfather was named Child’s parent on her birth certificate.

When Child was five years old, Mother and Stepfather divorced. They acknowledged that Stepfather was not the biological parent of Child. Still, in the 2021 parenting plan from the divorce, Mother and Stepfather agreed not to inform Child of her parentage until her 18^th birthday and that Stepfather would continue to act as Child’s father. Stepfather was ordered to pay child support.

When Child was seven years old, Mother told Biological Father that he was Child’s father. The next month, DNA testing confirmed this. Biological Father promptly filed a parentage action asking for a parenting plan and seeking to terminate any rights Stepfather may have.

Stepfather filed a petition for stepparent visitation.

Mother and Biological Father entered a proposed agreed parenting plan that provided for equal parenting time.

At the trial on Stepfather’s petition, Mother explained that Child was conceived while Mother and Stepfather were on a short “break” and that neither questioned Stepfather’s paternity until many years later. Also, Mother told Child about her parentage, despite the agreement in the divorce not to do so.

Both Mother and Biological Father testified that their goal was to terminate any visitation between Child and Stepfather. There was no dispute that Stepfather acted as Child’s parent for essentially the entirety of her life. The testimony showed that Child is very close to Stepfather and his extended family.

Child testified in camera. Her testimony shows she is angry at Mother for lying to her about her father. She has no bond with Biological Father and characterized him only as her horse-riding instructor. She unequivocally stated that she wanted to continue to visit with only Mother and Stepfather, who she views as her father.

The trial court found that because of the significant existing relationship between Stepfather and Child, there was a danger of substantial harm if Stepfather’s visitation was not granted. It further found it was in Child’s best interests for Stepfather to have ongoing visitation.

The trial court approved Mother and Biological Father’s proposed parenting plan, except Stepfather was awarded visitation every other weekend from Thursday evening until Sunday evening. This resulted in Stepfather’s visitation always overlapping with Mother’s weekend visitation such that she was not awarded any weekend visitation during the school year. The trial court found the schedule would not significantly reduce Mother’s time with Child, as she admitted she chose to work on weekends. Stepfather was also awarded one week during the summer.

Thus, Biological Father was awarded 50% of the parenting time, Mother was awarded 29%, and Stepfather was awarded 21%.

Mother appealed, arguing the trial court did not consider the parenting time between Mother and Biological Father, as its findings focused exclusively on Stepfather’s request for stepparent visitation..

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part.

When entering a parenting plan, Tennessee courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the best interest factors in TCA § 36-6-106(a). However, TCA § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) creates a presumption that equal parenting time is in a child’s best interest when the parents have agreed to equal parenting time. Unless both parents have agreed to a custody arrangement and parenting plan, orders for custody arrangements must include written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the basis for the order.

 The Court found the trial court did not properly analyze the best interest factors when determining the parenting plan:

It is true that Mother entered into a proposed parenting plan in which she and Biological Father would share joint custody, but their agreement failed to account for Stepfather’s visitation. Thus, the arrangement contemplated in the agreement – 182.5 days of parenting time each—is simply not possible where some time must be set aside for Stepfather’s visitation. Certainly, it cannot be said that Mother agreed to the ultimate arrangement established by the trial court in which she was awarded less than 30% of the time with the child and no weekend visitation during the school year. As such, it is arguable that this case does not fall within the narrow category of circumstances in which the Tennessee General Assembly has seen fit to dispense with the requirement that the trial court make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decision, i.e., where “both parents have agreed to a custody arrangement and parenting plan.”

While § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) may excuse the trial court from making written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision when the parties agree to a custody arrangement in parenting plan, it must still independently consider the child’s best interest prior to adopting the plan.

Our review of the trial court’s order suggests that the trial court failed to fully consider Child’s best interest when it adopted the proposed parenting plan as it relates to the time allotted to Mother and Biological father.

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The trial court made few findings in support of its allocation of parenting time between Mother and Biological Father. The trial court noted that Mother and Biological Father had entered into a proposed parenting plan giving them equal time with Child. And the trial court remarked that “there was very little, if any, focus of the proof of the [best interest factors] as to the parental sharing decision between [Mother] and [Biological Father].” The trial court then simply adopted the parenting plan proposed by Mother and Biological Father with the amendment that Stepfather would be granted visitation, all of which would be deducted from Mother’s parenting time. As a result, Biological Father, the individual with the least historical contact with Child, was granted more parenting time than Mother, who was undisputedly Child’s primary parent for her entire life.

But this “decision” to grant Biological Father so much time does not align with either the evidence for the trial court’s other findings. Importantly, the proof demonstrated that Biological Father had never had anything other than a few hours of visitation with Child where Mother was also present. The trial court also found that Biological Father’s focus was not on Child’s best interest, but only on “his rights” to his biological child to the exclusion of Stepfather. Likewise, the trial court appeared to question Biological Father’s willingness to facilitate a relationship with Stepfather should visitation be granted, citing Biological Father’s “extreme animosity” toward Stepfather. So the trial court awarded the most parenting time to the individual with the least contact with Child, who the trial court viewed as showing little concern for Child’s best interest and unlikely to facilitate a relationship with an individual whose removal from Child’s life the trial court found would cause her substantial harm. Given the trial court’s misgivings, it appears that the trial court concluded that it was bound by Mother and Biological Father’s agreement in this case and was without authority to depart from their agreed arrangement, except to the extent that it was ordering stepparent visitation. Respectfully, this was error.

We recognize that many of the purported errors of which Mother complains in this appeal are the product of her own making. It was her choice to agree not to inform Child of her parentage, only to break that promise when it was convenient for her. It was also her choice to align herself with Biological Father during these proceedings, only to have that decision result in her parenting time being substantially decreased. Indeed, half of the errors Mother asserts on appeal essentially contend that the trial court did not do more to save Mother from her own missteps. Only now, in this appeal, does Mother assert that in giving her what she asked for, the trial court erred. Often, this Court is reluctant to correct an error that a party had a hand in causing. However, we do not wield custody and parenting time decisions as weapons to punish parents for their poor decision-making. And it is the court’s responsibility to protect the interests of minor children where necessary to do substantial justice. Here, the question is whether the trial court adopted Mother’s and Biological Father’s proposal without undertaking the important task of first determining the child’s best interest. Having thoroughly reviewed the trial court’s order, we must conclude that the record fails to reflect that the trial court fulfilled its necessary role.

The Court vacated the trial court’s parenting plan and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the child’s best interest.

Stepparent visitation. Mother also argued that the trial court awarded Stepfather an unreasonable amount of visitation.

Stepparent visitation opposed by the parent requires a finding that the child had a significant existing relationship with the stepparent and the loss or severe reduction in contact is likely to cause substantial harm to the child. If this finding is made, the trial court must consider whether visitation would be in the child’s best interest. Only then may the trial court order “reasonable visitation.”

The Court also affirmed the award of stepparent visitation but vacated the trial court’s visitation schedule for Stepfather:

Here, the trial court made extensive findings in support of its conclusions that the substantial harm element had been met and that the best interest factors supported the award of visitation. In particular, the trial court noted that Stepfather and Child had a long-standing loving relationship that was based on their mutual belief for many years that Stepfather was Child’s biological parent. The trial court also noted that Child is bonded to Stepfather’s extended family, who continue to love Child and wish to spend time with her. In contrast, the trial court characterized the actions of Mother and Biological father as not focused on Child’s best interest but their own interests. The trial court in particular took issue with Mother’s actions, which it characterized as manipulative. The evidence also indicated that Child would likely suffer harm if Stepfather was not permitted a relationship with her. Moreover, the trial court found that Child expressed a strong desire to continue a relationship with Stepfather. But despite this fact, both Mother and Biological Father testified that their goal was to eventually terminate any relationship between Stepfather and Child. It was therefore clear from the trial court’s order that it believed that the only individual putting Child’s interest first in this case was Stepfather. Thus, the trial court’s findings that Child would suffer substantial harm if visitation was not granted and that visitation was in Child’s best interests are fully supported by the evidence in the record. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to award Stepfather visitation under § 36-6-303.

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No cases have specifically addressed a question regarding the amount of visitation that should be awarded pursuant to the stepparent visitation statute. Mother therefore relies heavily on the law developed with regard to Tennessee’s grandparent visitation statute.

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According to Mother, the trial court made [an] error in this case because it awarded Stepfather the same visitation that he had been awarded in the 2021 divorce action. Mother further contends that the visitation awarded was more extensive than necessary to maintain the relationship with Stepfather and instead interferes with her relationship with Child.

Although the cases involving grandparent visitation are helpful to our analysis given the fundamental parental rights at state, all cases involving custody and visitation with children must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the level of visitation necessary to minimize harm is dependent on the unique facts of each case. Given our disposition of the parenting plan issue, supra, we conclude that the issue of stepfather’s visitation schedule should also be vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider Stepfather’s visitation in conjunction with the parenting time awarded to Mother and Biological Father. Because Mother no longer disputes that Stepfather is entitled to visitation with Child, the only question to be decided under § 36-6-303 is the amount of visitation allotted to Stepfather and the schedule for such visitation.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s award of stepparent visitation but vacated and remanded the parenting plan for reconsideration.

Source: In re Gabby G. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, August 13, 2025).

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