Well, here it is—the post that gets the most views every year. But this year, there’s a twist. This year, my reaction to Tennessee’s new family-law legislation is a little more “meh” and a little less “OMGWTF!!!”

So, for the first time since I started publishing this blog over 15 years ago, I’m not recommending that you get drunk before reading any further. Instead, I recommend putting on some soft jazz in the background, making your favorite cocktail (limit: 1), and settling into a comfy chair to sip it as you read.

Rules of Appellate Procedure. TRAP 22 was amended to require that appellate motions include any legal argument necessary to support the motion. Additional briefs and memoranda of law should not be filed. If the motion is based on facts not in the record, it must be accompanied by an affidavit, unsworn declaration, or other supporting evidence. The General Assembly approved this on April 25, and it will take effect on July 1, 2025.

Adoption. Public Chapter 29 changes various adoption statutes to let adopted children review their adoption records once they are 18 instead of the previous requirement that they be 21 or older. This becomes effective July 1, 2025.

Public Chapter 386 allows adoptive parents who are adopting more than one child to include all the children in one petition when the children are siblings. Previously, a separate petition had to be filed for each child. This became effective May 5, 2025.

Public Chapter 390 clarifies that a putative father who paid financial support to benefit the child or the child’s mother does not include one who paid only “token” financial support. This became effective May 5, 2025.

“Economic Disadvantage” in Parental Termination and Dependent and Neglected Cases. Public Chapter 322 changes the main parental termination statute—§ 36-1-113—to add a new section clarifying that a parent’s “economic disadvantage … alone” is not a ground for termination. It also changes the definition of “neglect” in D&N cases to state that neglect “does not exist solely on the basis of economic disadvantage.” This becomes effective July 1, 2025.

Testimony of Abused Children. Videos of forensic interviews of children describing sexual or physically violent contact were previously admissible as long as the child testified that the video was an accurate recording of the events in the video. Public Chapter 162 changes that to allow the forensic interviewer who conducted the interview to testify that the video is accurate. So, that’s one less thing the child must testify to. The requirement that the child be available for cross-examination remains the same. This became effective on April 11, 2025.

Abuse. Public Chapter 398 expands the definition of “abuse” in dependency and neglect matters to include a child who witnesses abuse of another child or person in the home or immediate family. Also, if a child is removed and placed in foster care because of abuse, reunification between parent and child cannot occur unless (1) the parent has progressed such that reunification is safe and (2) the child has received whatever mental health services are necessary for reunification. This became effective May 5, 2025.

Comfort dogs. Public Chapter 167 creates a new statute—TCA § 24-7-126—that lets a court allow a witness to be accompanied by a “certified facility dog” to reduce the witness’s stress and “enhance the ability of the court to obtain full and accurate testimony.” One must first file a motion requesting approval of the certified facility dog. This became effective April 11, 2025.

Orders of Protection. Public Chapter 406 expands the jurisdiction for orders of protection from courts with jurisdiction over domestic relations matters to now include general sessions courts and criminal courts hearing a case involving a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. This became effective April 24, 2025.

Child’s Best-Interest Factors. Public Chapter 265 does these things:

1. Adds this language to the introductory paragraph of the primary best-interest statute, TCA § 36-6-106(a): “As required by § 36-6-404(b), only if the limitations of § 36-6-406(a)-(d) are not dispositive of the child’s residential schedule, then the court shall consider all relevant factors, including” the best-interest factors that follow.
2. Adds this new best-interest factor #15: “Whether a parent has had custody or parenting time reduced or restricted in the past and if so, the reasons custody or parenting time was relinquished.”
3. Adds a rebuttable presumption in parenting disputes and dependency and neglect cases that a parent whose parenting time is “restricted and supervised” because of abuse or criminal convictions must be “solely” responsible for all costs incurred because of the supervised visitation.
4. Supplements the definition of “abuse” in TCA § 36-3-601(1) to include acts inflicted directly by the “offending” party or indirectly through a third party on behalf of the “offending” party.

This becomes effective July 1, 2025.

K.O.’s Comment: Regarding #1, the limitations of § 36-6-406(a)-(d) have not been “dispositive” since subsection (a) was amended in 2020. That amendment changed the law from “a parent’s residential parenting time … shall be limited,” i.e., dispositive, to the current version that says parenting time “shall be limited if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child.” When this amendment occurred, no one deleted the old language in § 36-6-404(b) and § 36-6-106(g) that now incorrectly refers to § 36-6-406(a)-(d) as being “dispositive,” which it is no longer after the 2020 amendment. This new law replicates the old-and-now-inaccurate language by placing it in the prefatory paragraph of the best-interest factors, thus injecting clutter and potential confusion into the statute. The limitations in TCA § 36-6-406 have not been dispositive for five years.

As for #2, this is redundant because (1) this information is already in factor two and is always considered when a parent offers it, and (2) the term “relinquished” makes no sense in this context. Why not stick with “reduced or restricted”? Relinquished is defined as “to give up or to abandon a right or claim,” which is not at all the same as the right being reduced or restricted. Because of this poor drafting, lawyers can argue this doesn’t apply to their client because their client did not give up or abandon their parenting time. (I didn’t say they would succeed.) Tell me a non-lawyer drafted a law without telling me.

Public Chapter 321 changes the best-interest factor that previously required courts to consider “whether a parent has failed to pay court-ordered child support for a period of three years or more.” The new law removes the limitation of “for a period of three years or more.”

This law was proposed by the Executive Council of the TBA’s Family Law Section. Why remove the reference to three years or more? Because the rules of statutory construction meant Tennessee courts could not consider failing to pay child support for less than three years. Because the Tennessee Supreme Court recognizes the long-standing principle that “specific statutory provisions control over general provisions,” the now-deleted language prohibited courts from considering what the original author intended, i.e., considering in the best-interest analysis a parent’s failure to pay child support for any length of time, not just those few cases with a parent more than three years in arrears. So, the TBA’s Family Law Section fixed it. This is another example of why legislators would be wise to consult the TBA’s Family Law Section on proposed legislation. This became effective May 2, 2025.

Grandparent Visitation. Public Chapter 321 amends § 36-6-306 to create a new subsection (g) giving trial courts the discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses to either party in a grandparent visitation case. This is also the result of the work by the TBA’s Family Law Section. This was the TBA’s reasoning (minus the citations):

TCA § 36-5-103(c) allows trial courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in child-related litigation, i.e., visitation, custody, and child support disputes. The grandparent visitation statute, TCA § 36-6-306, does not give trial courts this authority.

The purpose of letting courts award attorney’s fees in child-related litigation is to protect the child’s interest and legal remedies as a matter of public policy. Allowing an award of attorney’s fees is for the child’s benefit and recognizes that, in certain situations, the prevailing party should not have to bear the expense incurred on the child’s behalf.

The Court of Appeals has held that trial courts do not have the discretion to award attorney’s fees in grandparent visitation cases.

Grandparent visitation cases involve court-ordered visitation and related considerations, including determining the child’s best interest. There is often an economic disparity between the parties, as grandparents are likely to have more economic security than parents. This can cause economic hardship for parents and may lead to outcomes based on financial pressures instead of the child’s best interest. Allowing trial courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees in grandparent visitation cases could mitigate these economic disparities in appropriate cases. It would also protect the child’s best interest by giving the trial court the option to award attorney’s fees in appropriate cases. Alternatively, grandparents may be on a fixed income and may have to use their life savings to pursue visiting with their grandchild. Therefore, the proposed language models the parental relocation statute’s language, which does not favor one party over the other and does not discourage the filing of good-faith claims. See TCA § 36-6-108(f), the attorney’s fee provision in the parental relocation statute.

This became effective May 2, 2025.

K.O.’s Comment: Among other things, the TBA’s Family Law Section proposes legislation and helps it become law. If any TBA members have ideas for proposed legislation you want the Family Law Section’s Executive Council to consider, let us know.

Families’ Rights and Responsibilities Act. Public Chapter 347 clarifies the FRRA in a few ways, including:

• While a parent can excuse their child from school for religious purposes, the school may require the parent to attend a meeting to discuss the child’s educational future if the child is absent at least 20 days during a school year for religious purposes.
• The Act does not apply when a person acts reasonably to render appropriate, nonemergency first aid to a sick or injured child.

This becomes effective July 1, 2025.

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