Facts: Mother and Father divorced in 2016.

In 2020, Father moved to reduce his child-support obligation, which request was granted by default after Mother failed to file a responsive pleading.

Two years later, Father petitioned to modify the parenting plan to be the primary residential parent and further reduce his child support.

In February 2023, Father’s attorney informed Mother’s attorney that he was “working on a couple of unrelated cases with [First Judge]” but did not think First Judge would be biased in his favor. He added: “I’d rather give you a heads up now, so we can ask for a different judge now instead of on the hearing date.”

In March 2023, Mother filed a motion asking First Judge to recuse himself and for the designation of a judge to sit by interchange. For grounds, Mother said she “recently learned” that Father’s counsel had clerked or interned for First Judge.

That same month, the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court entered a routine standing order designating three judges to sit by interchange if First Judge was unavailable or recused himself for any reason. Second Judge was one of the three listed judges.

While Mother’s motion to recuse was pending, Tennessee’s Child Support Services moved to modify Father’s child support temporarily. After a hearing, First Judge temporarily reduced Father’s child-support obligation.

Shortly thereafter, Mother moved to set aside the order. First Judge did not rule on Mother’s motions to vacate or recuse and did not enter an order transferring the case to another judge by interchange.

Five weeks later, the case was heard by Second Judge, who entered an order modifying the parenting plan and designating Father as the primary residential parent.

After Mother challenged this, Second Judge found she was properly designated to sit by interchange under a standing order from the Tennessee Supreme Court. Second Judge also found that counsel for both parties agreed she would hear the matter.

Mother appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

The issue is whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Second Judge was not properly designated to preside by interchange.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute and the Tennessee Constitution. It refers to a court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy. Courts cannot exercise jurisdictional powers that have not been conferred directly on them expressly or by necessary implication. A court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.

A judge sitting by interchange acquires the power of the judge in whose place the judge is acting. Interchange allows judges from other courts to sit by interchange in a court with subject-matter jurisdiction when the original judge cannot preside over the matter for whatever reason.

Subject-matter jurisdiction relates to a particular court’s authority to adjudicate a matter, not that of an individual judge sitting by interchange.

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B states: “Upon the filing of a motion [to recuse], the judge shall act promptly by written order and either grant or deny the motion.” The trial judge is also prohibited from taking further action in the case while the motion is pending except for good cause stated in the order in which such action is taken. Rule 10B specifically prohibits trial judges who recuse from picking their successors.

The Court found Second Judge was not correctly designated to hear the case by interchange and, therefore, lacked authority to rule on it:

[First Judge] did not enter an order granting or denying Mother’s motion to recuse, nor did he enter an order transferring the case to [Second Judge] to preside by interchange. Further, [First Judge] adjudicated the [] motion to modify Father’s child-support obligation while Mother’s motion to recuse was pending. Additionally, Mother argues that [because of] the trial court’s failure to: (1) follow the procedural requirements of Rule 10B, (2) enter an order on her motion to recuse, or (3) enter an order transferring the matter, there is nothing to demonstrate that [First Judge] did not specifically choose [Second Judge] to preside by interchange.

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We have repeatedly held that the requirements of Rule 10B must be strictly followed. These requirements are mandatory.

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[T]he transfer of the matter is not accomplished absent an order of the court. Even where a trial court’s order is characterized as “ministerial” or “procedural,” entry of the order is still required. In the absence of the required order granting or denying Mother’s motion to recuse (and, if recusal was granted, and order transferring the case to be heard by interchange), the case was not properly transferred to [Second Judge] under Rule 10B.

The Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Source: Haggard v Carroll (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, December 18, 2024).

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