Facts: Mother and Father are the divorced parents of Child.

Mother withdrew Child from school when Child was 17. Child was homeschooled thereafter.

In January 2019, the trial court modified Father’s child-support obligation and scheduled it to end on May 16, 2019, when Child’s class was scheduled to graduate from high school.

On June 27, 2019, when Child was 19, Mother petitioned to extend child support beyond Child’s 21^st birthday because of Child’s severe disability. Child had been declared disabled six months earlier by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and began receiving Supplemental Security Income benefits.

The trial court found Child suffered from several learning and developmental issues making Child highly unlikely ever to be independent or maintain full employment. The extent of Child’s employment capacity would be as a store greeter. Child could not perform many of a functioning adult’s daily needs and requirements. Child functioned at the level of an eight or nine-year-old child and would never function at a higher level.

The trial court found it retained subject-matter jurisdiction because Child had been determined by the SSA to be disabled in January 2019, i.e., before Child’s expected graduation date in May 2019.

The trial court extended Father’s child-support obligation, ordered Father to pay an arrearage, and awarded Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Father argued the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to extend Father’s child-support obligation.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

In Tennessee, a parent’s legal obligation to support their child generally ends when the child graduates from high school or the class of which the child is a member when the child turns 18 graduates, whichever occurs first. However, an exception to this rule exists for a child who, before reaching the age of majority, is found to be disabled (when support may be continued through age 21) or severely disabled (when support may be continued indefinitely).

TCA § 36-5-101(k)(2) says a Tennessee court “may require the obligor to continue to pay child support for such period as it deems in the best interest of the child.”

Father argued the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because after Child’s graduation date on May 16, 2019, there was no child support order to “continue” per the statute.

The Court resolved this issue of first impression in Tennessee by examining the meaning of “continue” when there was a brief interruption of support, i.e., during the 42 days between Child’s expected graduation date and filing Mother’s petition to continue support:

In common usage, “continue,” as relevant to the case at bar, may be defined as either “to maintain without interruption a condition, course, or action” or “to resume an activity after interruption.” In turn, “interruption” is defined as “a stoppage or hindering of an activity for a time” or “a break in the continuity of something.” The fact that “continue” may be interpreted as describing an activity conducted either “without interruption” or “after interruption” indicates that usage of the term in the statute is somewhat ambiguous. However, the legislative history of the inclusion of “continue” in TCA § 36-5-101(k)(2) demonstrates that the General Assembly included the term to ensure that parents would not be obligated indefinitely to support adult children who become severely disabled after reaching the age of majority. We find no indication that the General Assembly intended that a brief interruption in child support, such as the 42-day period here, should divest a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction when that court had previously exercised subject-matter jurisdiction to award such support before a child attained the age of majority.

We hold that under TCA § 36-5-101(k)(2), a brief interruption in child support does not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a petition to extend support for a severely disabled child beyond the age of majority. We decline to create a bright-line rule for a length of time that would constitute a “brief” interruption. However, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case—including (1) the existence of a valid child-support order entered at the time of the parties’ divorce, (2) the entry of the January 2019 Order continuing child support, and (3) the 42-day gap between the graduation date of Child’s high school class and Mother’s filing of the petition—we conclude that the interruption in this case was brief and that the trial court maintained subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Mother’s petition and ultimately to continue Father’s child-support obligation upon finding that Child was severely disabled.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Source: Ratcliff v. Neal (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, November 4, 2024).

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