Facts: Mother took her four children to the emergency room because she believed something was crawling under their skin, and bugs and worms were coming out of their bodies. Mother was admitted to a behavioral-health hospital, where she tested positive for methamphetamine.

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the children from Mother’s custody. The court found the children dependent and neglected.

Over a year later, Mother gave birth to another child, who was subsequently found dependent and neglected and the victim of severe child abuse because of Mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy.

DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother arrived at the trial two hours late and signed a surrender of her parental rights in the judge’s chambers with her attorney present. The court advised Mother it would move forward with the termination hearing—which it did—before terminating Mother’s parental rights to the children.

Mother then revoked the surrender of her parental rights within the three-day statutory rescission period.

Mother appealed, arguing the trial court erred in proceeding with the termination hearing after Mother voluntarily surrendered her parental rights because her pre-surrender legal status should have been restored when she rescinded the surrender.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

TCA § 36-1-112 states that a person who executes a surrender of their parental rights may revoke that surrender within three days. The statute specifically says:

the execution of a revocation of a surrender within the three-day period shall be grounds for the dismissal of any adoption petition filed during that period and, upon motion of the person who revoked the surrender, the court shall dismiss the adoption petition without prejudice.

The Court found no error in the trial court’s decision to proceed with the trial after Mother’s voluntary surrender of her parental rights:

Contrary to Mother’s argument, nothing in the statute requires the court to dismiss a petition filed prior to a party’s surrender of his or her rights or to continue or delay a contested termination hearing during the revocation period. Indeed, as DCS asserts, the General Assembly has instructed courts to prioritize and expedite contested termination of parental rights proceedings over all other civil litigation other than child protective services cases. Additionally, [] the court may reduce the three-day revocation period to a 24-hour revocation period if the birth parent is represented by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the state. In short, there is nothing in the statute from which we could infer that a trial court is required to sua sponte continue or delay a termination-of-parental-rights hearing in a contested proceeding when a parent voluntarily surrenders his or her parental rights. Although the statute allows a parent to withdraw his or her surrender of this fundamental right, the statute certainly is not intended as a delay mechanism in a contested proceeding.

*     *     *     *     *

[W]e note that the trial court did not terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her surrender of same. Rather, the trial court’s decision was based on the substantive grounds asserted by DCS and the evidence presented at the hearing. Mother had notice of the hearing, was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and had the opportunity to put on proof. In its final order, the trial court made findings of fact with respect to the grounds alleged in DCS’s petition and assessed the Children’s best interests. Mother’s surrender of her parental rights was not a factor in the trial court’s judgment, and Mother’s right to revoke her voluntary surrender during the statutory period was not abridged.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Source: In re Amiyah W. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, September 4, 2024).

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