Facts: Husband and Wife divorced after 27 years of marriage. Their divorce trial took place over seven days between November and June.

In May, the trial judge—Chancellor Pridemore—was defeated in a primary election. He continued to preside over the trial.

At the trial’s end, Chancellor Pridemore did not say how he intended to rule or why. Instead, he asked the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In October, just before his statutory authority expired, Chancellor Pridemore entered a one-page order adopting Wife’s 59-page proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full after “an in-depth review and long consideration.” The overall division of the marital estate gave Husband 55% and Wife 45%. Wife was also awarded her attorney’s fees.

Husband appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

In Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated two conditions for party-prepared orders. First, the findings and conclusions must accurately reflect the trial court’s decision. Second, the record must not create doubt that the decision represents the trial court’s own deliberations and decision.

The Supreme Court also observed in Smith:

A trial court’s verbatim adoption submitted by the prevailing party detracts from the appearance of a hard-working, independent judge and does little to enhance the reputation of the judiciary. At the very least, it gives rise to the impression that the trial judge either has not considered the losing party’s arguments, or has done little more than choose between two provided options rather than fashioning a considered, independent ruling based on the evidence, the filings, argument of counsel, and applicable legal principles. At worst, it risks creating an appearance of bias or the impression that the trial court ceded its decision-making responsibility to one of the parties.

To avoid this perception, the Supreme Court noted a trial court may:

• state the grounds for its decision at the same time it announces its decision on the record;
• announce its decision and inform counsel that it will provide the grounds in a subsequently filed memorandum or a memorandum opinion;
• the trial court may notify the parties of the grounds for its decision by letter, as long as the letter has been provided to all parties and has been made part of the record; and
• use a party-prepared order but make alterations to it reflecting that the court used independent judgment.

The Court found none of that here:

In the present case, Chancellor Pridemore did none of these things. Without stating on the record in advance how he intended to rule or why, he merely adopted Wife’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. If the trial court simply adopts one of the proposed orders without alterations, then the trial court has not comply with Smith. Clearly, Chancellor Pridemore’s order did not comply with Smith.

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Wife is correct in that this Court has, on occasion, proceeded on the merits despite a trial court’s failure to fully comply with Smith. However, that we have sometimes exercised our discretion to proceed does not mean the collapse of the rule, with the rule being that a trial court’s judgment must be the product of its own deliberations. Here, Chancellor Pridemore stated in his one-page order adopting Wife’s proposal in full that he conducted an “in-depth review” and gave the matter “long consideration.” That alone will not suffice. If a trial court could get around Smith by adopting a party-prepared order in full despite having never announced on the record how it would rule or why simply by saying that it considered the matter carefully and did an in-depth review, Smith would be dead letter. Courts are supposed to consider and review the cases before them in-depth as a matter of course. That should go without saying…. Here, Chancellor Pridemore effectively ceded to Wife carte blanche ability to craft the order, make factual findings, and supply the legal reasoning. Wife asked us to review the record to find support for her own proposal, which was adopted without any input from Chancellor Pridemore. However, this fact-intensive and credibility-intensive case is especially unsuited for a so-called archaeological dig. It was for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the first instance, which we could then review on appeal.

Wife argues that we should proceed all the same because her proposal was not unduly skewed in her favor…. Wife is heavily favored throughout.

*     *     *     *     *

The record creates significant doubt that Chancellor Pridemore exercised independent judgment in deciding this case. Furthermore, this is not a matter suited to “soldiering on.” We, therefore, vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. In so ruling, we are not unmindful of the costs these parties will incur. Nevertheless, the issues are fact-intensive and depend in no small part on the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility. This being the case, we cannot simply remand for a corrected judgment since Chancellor Pridemore is no longer on the bench. Regrettably, a new trial is necessary.

The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment.

Source: Johnson v. Johnson (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, July 31, 2024).

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