Facts: Husband and Wife signed a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) that required Husband to pay certain of Wife’s expenses, such as the mortgage, utilities, car payment, etc., as rehabilitative alimony until their child graduated from high school. After their child’s high school graduation, Wife would receive $1646 from Husband’s military retired pay. The agreement further provides: “Should Wife’s interest in Husband’s military retirement not equal at least $1646, Husband shall make up the difference such that Wife’s total money received is $1646.”

Several years later, Husband filed a petition for a declaratory judgment. He claimed he received military retired pay of $1879 per month to which Wife would have the right to 27% or $507.33 per month per the military. Husband claimed the additional $1138.67 should be considered alimony subject to modification by the Court.

Wife moved to dismiss Husband’s petition for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

The trial court found the award of $1646 from Husband’s military retired pay “was a division of property and is a final division of property.” Wife’s motion to dismiss was granted, and Wife was awarded part of her attorney’s fees.

Husband appealed, arguing that the parties intended to treat Wife’s portion of the military retired pay as alimony in futuro, which is modifiable.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

A marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) is essentially a contract between spouses in contemplation of divorce proceedings.

Tennessee courts interpret an MDA like any other contract. If the language is clear and unambiguous, courts apply the literal meaning of the contract, and the language is construed using its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.

If contractual provisions prove ambiguous, i.e., where more than one reasonable interpretation of the provision exists, the courts will use other rules of contract construction to determine the parties’ intent.

The Court agreed that the division of military retirement benefits was a final property division that is not subject to change:

In arguing that the $1646 payment is modifiable, Husband characterizes the retirement payment as being alimony in futuro because he views it as a form of long-term support. It appears that Husband’s rationale for this characterization is the fact that the first reference to this payment appeared in a section entitled “Alimony” and the fact that there is no definite total amount (as contemplated by the statutory definition of alimony in solido). However, both the original provision on military retirement and [a subsequent agreed order] reference the award of retirement benefits [] and provide that the retirement payments are to begin after the rehabilitative alimony payments. Under Tennessee law, retirement benefits that accrued during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution. We see no ambiguity here and nothing in the language of the MDA indicating that the parties intended to treat Husband’s military retirement as alimony in futuro rather than a division of marital property.

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Here, Husband did not appeal the award of military retirement benefits to Wife. The parties agreed to the provisions concerning military retirement, which are more generous to Wife than federal law would allow a state court to decree. This Court has previously stated: “An MDA is a contract, and parties are free to contract support for provisions outside a statute’s realm.”

We conclude the trial court properly rejected Husband’s challenge to the military retirement provisions of the MDA.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the division of military retirement benefits was a property division and, therefore, is not subject to change.

Source: Remus v. Nunn (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, March 27, 2024).

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