Facts: Man and Woman began a romantic relationship in late 2018. In June 2019, Woman adopted her grandson. Man and Woman never married, and Woman ended the relationship in December 2019.

One and a half years later, Man petitioned to adopt Woman’s child/grandson.

Woman moved to dismiss the adoption petition for lack of standing. She pointed out that Man was not the father of the child, never had legal or physical custody of the child, and had never been a stepparent to the child.

Woman also alleged the adoption lawsuit was “abusive civil litigation” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-41-101.

The trial court found that Man lacked standing to file the adoption petition and dismissed it with prejudice. It also found it was an abusive civil action and awarded Woman $3200 for her attorney’s fees.

Unable to discern when something is over, Man appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

The doctrine of standing is used to determine whether a plaintiff has the right to judicial relief. When deciding whether a plaintiff has standing to sue, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to justify judicial intervention. The primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not the merits of the party’s claim.

Tennessee law specifically designates those who may file a petition for adoption. Thus, a Tennessee court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an adoption petition unless the party filing the petition has standing. If standing is lacking, the court must dismiss the case.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-115 governs who is eligible to file adoption petitions. A petitioner seeking to adopt the child must have physical custody of the child or must show they have the right to receive custody of the child as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-111(d)(6).

The Court agreed that Man lacked standing to file an adoption petition:

We recall that the relationship between [Man] and [Woman] ended in December 2019. A year and a half after the relationship ended, [Man] filed the petition for adoption. Turning to the petition, [Man] did not allege that he had physical custody of the child. Rather, he alleged that despite his attempts to act as the child’s father, [Woman] had “taken active steps to deny [Man] from fulfilling his desire to be the child’s father.” In support of his contention, [Man] alleged that [Woman] filed a petition for a protective order to prevent [Man] from seeing the child. Because he did not have physical custody of the child, to have standing to file the adoption petition, [Man] was required to demonstrate that he had the right to receive custody as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-111(d)(6), [which identifies who can accept a surrender of a child in the context of an agreed, consensual adoption].

[Woman] neither surrendered the child nor consented to his adoption by [Man], and [Man] did not allege that she did so. Furthermore, [Man] did not allege that he had physical custody of the child. Additionally, [Man] failed to allege any facts to show that he was going to receive physical custody of the child in the future as provided in the statute…. [Man] failed to allege facts to show that he was eligible to file a petition to adopt the child. In other words, [Man] failed to show that he had a “sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant a judicial intervention.” Thus, [Man] lacked standing to pursue adoption and the trial court properly concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case and it dismissed [Man’s] petition with prejudice.

Although Man was neither the biological, adoptive, nor stepparent of the child, Man asserted he was a “legal parent” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(29)(iii), which includes when a man tried to marry the biological mother of the child before the child’s birth in compliance with the law, even if the marriage is declared invalid, if the child was born during the attempted marriage or within 300 days after the termination of the attempted marriage.

The Court made quick work of this:

We deduce that [Man] relies on this section of the statute to allege that he is the child’s “legal parent.” Specifically, [Man] alleged that he attempted to marry [Woman] and that [Woman] became the adoptive parent of the child “within 365 days of the anticipated date of marriage.” Even if the foregoing were true ([Woman] disputes that she intended to marry [Man]), [Man] is still not a legal parent of the child for two reasons. First, it is undisputed that [Woman] is the biological grandmother of the child, not the biological mother, as required under the statute. Second, although [Woman] formally adopted the child during the parties’ relationship, the child was born before the relationship began. Accordingly, even if [Man] attempted to marry [Woman], he still does not meet the statutory definition of a “legal parent” of the child.

Finding that Man did not have standing to file a petition to adopt the child, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss his petition with prejudice. The Court also found Man’s appeal to be “frivolous” and awarded Woman her attorney’s fees on appeal.

Source: Curran v. Melson (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, June 12, 2023).

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