Facts: Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of Child. Father struggled with longstanding substance abuse issues.

Years later, Mother and Stepfather petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights and have Stepfather adopt Child.

The grounds pleaded for termination were

• abandonment by failure to support,
• abandonment by failure to visit, and
• persistent conditions, namely Father’s “persistent addiction to methamphetamine which has resulted in his repeated incarceration.”

The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of the pleaded grounds but added findings for an unpleaded ground:

The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that prior to Father’s incarceration, he engaged in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and that this is demonstrated by the fact he is incarcerated at the time of trial.

Father appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in part.

Tennessee courts must strictly apply the procedural requirements in cases involving the termination of parental rights.

Parental rights can be terminated only on grounds alleged in the termination petition.

Notice of the issues to be tried in the court is a fundamental component of due process. Pleadings must give the opposing party enough notice of the issues to prepare a defense. For example, due process requires that the parent be notified of the alleged grounds for termination in parental termination cases.

Unless a ground for termination is tried by implied consent, parental rights may be terminated only on the statutory grounds alleged in the petition. Otherwise, the parent would be disadvantaged in preparing a defense.

The Court held it was error to terminate Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child because that issue was neither pleaded nor tried by implied consent:

Our review of the allegations in the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights confirms that Father was not put on sufficient notice that his parental rights could be terminated on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Neither the word “wanton” nor the word “disregard” appear in the petition, and the pertinent statutory definition for termination is not specifically referenced. Therefore, we find that Father lacked proper notice from the petition that his parental rights could be terminated on the basis of abandonment by wanton disregard.

This does not conclude our analysis, however, because a ground for termination not included in the petition can be properly found if it was tried by implied consent. To support a finding that the ground of wanton disregard was tried by implied consent, it must be clear from the record that any evidence presented that is relevant to the unpleaded ground had no relevance to any other issue being presented to the trial court. Our review of the record confirms that the ground of wanton disregard was not tried by implied consent. At the beginning of the trial, the judge stated:

THE COURT: All right. In this case the grounds, as I understand it, are abandonment—let’s see. All right. And that is specifically failure to support and specifically failure to visit. Father is alleged to be inadequately able to care for the child. Persistent conditions. Is that it?

MOTHER’S ATTORNEY: Yes, Your Honor.

In addition, any testimony about Father’s conduct prior to his incarceration was relevant to the court’s best interest analysis, not only to the unpleaded ground of wanton disregard. Therefore, we find that the ground of wanton disregard was not properly raised in the pleadings and was not tried by consent of the parties. We vacate the trial court’s holding that parental rights should be terminated on the ground of wanton disregard.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on another ground for termination and its finding that termination is in Child’s best interest. Thus, Father’s parental rights were terminated even though the ground of wanton disregard was reversed.

K.O.’s Comment: This opinion uses “pled” instead of “pleaded” and “unpled” instead of “unpleaded,” which I’ve corrected in the block quote. This displeases me for reasons explained here. What say you?

In re Lauren F. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, November 10, 2021).

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