Facts: Custody of Child was transferred to Aunt and Uncle because of the biological parents’ substance abuse.

Later, Aunt and Uncle petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father and adopt Child.

Aunt testified that she intended to continue the relationship between Child and Mother and Father by allowing visitation.

After terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father and granting the adoption of Child by Aunt and Uncle, the trial court ordered Aunt and Uncle

to submit an agreed order that will survive the adoption for reasonable visitation between the child and both parents or submit a pre-adoption contract pursuant to statute which would provide for a continuation in the relationship with the child and both birth parents. The Court finds and believes that this part of its order is very much in the best interest of the minor child, will affect continuity in the child’s life, will maintain the status quo regarding limited contact for [the] birth parents, and will hold “Aunt” to her word on the witness stand.

Aunt and Uncle challenged the requirement that they enter into a preadoption contract.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-121(f) says a final order of adoption cannot require the adoptive parent to permit visitation by any other person, nor can the final order of adoption place any conditions on the adoption of the child.

The statute does not, however, prohibit parties from signing a post-adoption contract under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-145. This statute allows adoptive parents to “voluntarily enter into” a contract with a biological parent and the child if the child is at least 14 years old that allows continued contact between the child and his or her relatives after the adoption is finalized. This contract for post-adoption contact must be in writing, and it is enforceable by the court.

The Court found the trial court erred by requiring the parties to sign a preadoption contract as a condition for the adoption:

The trial court’s requiring the parties to enter into an agreed order as part of the adoption proceedings directly conflicts with such prohibition in [Tennessee Code Annotated] § 36-1-121(f).

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The issue of whether a trial court can order a party to enter into a contract for post-adoption contact is a matter of first impression. As with any contract, a contract for post-adoption contact is valid only if entered into voluntarily. In fact, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-145 allows the adoptive parents and biological parents to “voluntarily enter into” such a contract for post-adoption contact. We acknowledge that Aunt testified during trial that she intended to allow a continuing relationship between Child and the biological parents after adoption. Even so, the trial court’s order requiring the parties in this case to enter into a contract allowing visitation after the adoption in order to continue the visiting relationship between Child and the biological parents is hardly voluntary. A parties’ testimony of intent to allow continued contact is much different than a legally binding contract requiring such contact. While we understand what the trial court was attempting to do and why, we agree with [Aunt and Uncle] that the trial court did not have the authority to require the parties to enter into a contract for post-adoption contact.

The Court affirmed the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and reversed the trial court’s requirement that the parties enter into a contract permitting post-adoption contact.

In re Rosylyn W. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, October 13, 2020).