Facts: Two days after Child’s birth to unmarried Mother, Father petitioned to establish paternity and change the child’s last name.

The trial court found that Mother and her family had engaged in a pattern of harassing behavior designed to prevent Father from seeing Child.

The trial court ruled that Child’s surname would be changed to Father’s surname for two reasons:

• because Mother’s brother had a felony conviction, and
• to discourage Mother from future attempts to prevent Father’s relationship with Child.

Mother appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-3-305(b)(1), the last name of a child born to an unmarried mother is generally the mother’s last name, the mother’s maiden last name, or a combination of the two.

Tennessee courts should not change a child’s surname unless the change promotes the child’s best interest. Among the criteria for determining whether changing a child’s surname will be in the child’s best interest are:

• the child’s preference,
• the change’s potential effect on the child’s relationship with each parent,
• the length of time the child has had its present surname,
• the degree of community respect associated with the present and proposed surname, and
• the difficulty, harassment, or embarrassment the child may experience from bearing either its present or its proposed surname.

The parent looking to change the child’s last name must prove that the change will further the child’s best interest. The amount of proof required to justify the change is substantial. Minor inconvenience or embarrassment is not enough.

The Court found the trial court’s reasons to be inadequate:

[W]hen asked about the change’s potential effect on the child’s relationship with each parent, Father answered that the change would not affect his relationship with the child and that he did not know whether the change would affect the child’s relationship with Mother. This testimony certainly does not show that a change is in the child’s best interest. Father’s request fares somewhat better as to the next factor: “the length of time the child has had its present surname.” While the child had Mother’s surname for its entire life, the child was not yet one-year-old at the time of trial. Father also admitted that there was no difficulty, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experience from bearing either its present or its proposed surname. On the whole, these factors therefore provide little to no support for the name change.

Indeed, the only factor that Father presented any evidence of was regarding the degree of community respect associated with the present and proposed surname. The evidence of this factor, however, was minimal at best. In essence, Father testified that Mother’s half-brother had been convicted of a felony. Mother admitted that her half-brother had been sentenced to three years in prison for a crime but could not testify as to any specifics. There was no evidence, however, that a single conviction by Mother’s half-sibling for an unknown crime at an unknown time had caused the family name to lose respect in the community. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the evidence supports a finding that this factor favors the name change.

The trial court did consider an additional factor: Mother’s and Grandmother’s interference in Father’s relationship with the child. Additionally, Father testified that it was his strong preference to have the child carry his name in order to carry on his family lineage. Although the trial court was permitted to consider all relevant factors, we conclude that these facts were not sufficient to support the name change.

As an initial matter, the mere preference of a parent is not a reason to justify a name change. Father’s testimony that he “would just like him to have my name” is therefore not sufficient to show that the name change was in the child’s best interest.

Moreover, this Court has previously held that a trial court’s concern over the mother’s previous attempts to thwart the relationship between [the] father and child and [the court’s] belief that changing the child’s surname would somehow strengthen the relationship between the child and [the] father was insufficient to support a name change. . . .

The trial court used essentially the same reasoning in the case at bar, opining that the name change “might influence Mother and Grandmother to cease their attempt to prevent Father from seeing his child.” However, no evidence was presented to support this finding. Indeed, as previously discussed, Father even testified that the change would not have a potential effect on the child’s relationship with him. As such, there is simply no evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that changing the child’s surname was in his best interest. The trial court erred in granting Father’s request.

The Court reversed the trial court’s ruling changing the child’s last name.

Knipper v. Enfinger (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, August 31, 2020).