Facts: Mother and Father divorced in 2018 under a Final Decree incorporating a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”). Father was obligated to pay child support, various child-related expenses, and transitional alimony to Mother for eight years. The MDA included a dispute-resolution clause requiring the prevailing party in any enforcement action to recover attorney’s fees and costs. Mother filed this post-divorce action in April 2022 by filing a petition to enforce the MDA and PPP, for a money judgment, to modify the PPP, and for civil contempt. She alleged Father had failed to pay $30,000 in alimony and $13,112 in child support, and she sought to enforce those obligations and recover her attorney’s fees. Father answered and counterclaimed, denying Mother’s requests and seeking sole decision-making authority, attorney’s fees, and other relief. In April 2023, Father petitioned to terminate his alimony obligation, alleging that Mother was cohabiting. In December 2022—after Mother’s enforcement efforts had begun—Father paid the full child support and alimony arrears that Mother claimed. He delivered two checks to Mother totaling $16,216 for child support and $33,750 for alimony. The remaining disputes were resolved at mediation in July 2023, resulting in an agreed order that resolved all issues except the competing claims for attorney’s fees. In the Agreed Order, Mother received additional parenting time, sole decision-making authority for the youngest child, an increase of $908 per month in child support, a $13,800 retroactive child support judgment, and an extra $3,000 payment. Father, in turn, obtained termination of his $2,000/month transitional alimony (three years early), an end to his life-insurance obligation, and the elimination or capping of several other contractual obligations under the MDA. In short, both parties got some of what they wanted from the mediation, with the only unresolved issue being attorneys’ fees. Each party asked the trial court to declare them the “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees. The trial court reviewed the MDA’s fee clause and TCA § 36-5-103(c) and concluded that both parties had achieved some beneficial relief, materially changing each other’s behavior. Because neither party clearly prevailed overall, the trial court declined to award attorney’s fees to either Mother or Father under either the MDA or the Statute. Mother’s post-trial motion to alter or amend was denied, and she appealed. On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. Tennessee law follows the “American Rule,” under which each party pays their own attorney’s fees absent an express statute or contract to the contrary. Here, both a contractual and a statutory exception applied. The parties’ MDA contains a fee-shifting clause that requires an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any proceeding “to procure enforcement” of the agreement. This contractual provision does not cover actions to modify the parties’ obligations. Separately, TCA § 36-5-103(c) allows a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in actions to enforce or to alter, change, or modify decrees for alimony, child support, or custody, including contempt proceedings. Unlike the MDA’s mandatory fee clause, the statute gives the court discretion to award fees to the prevailing party. When both a contract and a statute authorize attorney’s fees, Tennessee courts analyze the contractual request first; if a mandatory fee provision applies, the prevailing party’s fees must be awarded, with the court’s only discretion being to determine a reasonable amount. Only after enforcing any applicable mandatory clause should the court consider a discretionary fee statute. A “prevailing party” in this context is generally the party whose action leads to a material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties, even if the case is resolved without a final judgment on the merits. The Court of Appeals held that Mother was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees for the enforcement portion of this case: Mother achieved her objective of forcing Father to pay the alimony and child support arrearages. Furthermore, as noted above, Mother’s court filings resulted in a material alteration of the positions of the parties when Father paid the arrearages. Such “material alteration” is the touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry. Therefore, we hold that Mother is the prevailing party under the dispute resolution provision in the MDA because she forced Father to pay past due child support and alimony. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding Mother’s right to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA and remand with instructions for the trial court to award Mother a judgment for the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs she incurred to enforce Father’s obligations to pay child support and alimony. However, the Court agreed with the trial court that neither party could be deemed the prevailing party on the modification issues: We further agree with the trial court’s reasoning in relation to the Modification Claims that “both parties 1) were awarded relief through the judicial system in their Agreed Order, 2) were awarded some relief that they sought, 3) achieved their own beneficial results and 4) these results materially altered the other party’s behavior.” Based on these findings, the trial court ruled that neither party was the sole prevailing party. We agree with this determination to the extent it applies to the Modification Claims. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to not award attorney’s fees under the Statute. When success is mixed, as is the case here in relation to the Modification Claims, courts evaluate the relative success of the parties, including the significance of the issues on which each prevailed and the overall circumstances of the case…. [B]ecause “[b]oth parties in this case were partially successful … neither party is a clear winner.” In the context of the Modification Claims, we agree that there is no clear winner. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s determination that there was no prevailing party in the context of the claims submitted to mediation and resolved by the Agreed Order, they being the Modification Claims. Similarly, the Court denied each party’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal because each party prevailed in part: Both parties seek to recover the attorney’s fees they incurred in this appeal. Each party was partially successful, but neither party can be considered the prevailing party on appeal. Thus, we respectfully deny both requests. Thus, the trial court was upheld on all issues except its denial of Mother’s contractual right to attorney’s fees under the MDA and PPP, which was reversed. K.O.’s Comment: Mother ultimately recovered her attorney’s fees for enforcing Father’s obligations because her MDA had a well-drafted fee clause. Tennessee courts have made clear that such fee provisions must be enforced as written: when a valid MDA mandates fees to the prevailing party, judges have no discretion to deny fees once someone qualifies as the prevailing party. Source: Wright v. Wright (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Division, March 13, 2026). If you find this helpful, please share it using the buttons below.
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Prevailing Party Dispute Over Attorney’s Fees in Franklin, Tennessee: Wright v. Wright was last modified: April 3rd, 2026 by
