Facts: Wife filed for divorce after 20 years of marriage.

The marital estate consisted of three adjoining parcels of real estate that came from Wife’s side of the family. Wife entered the marriage owning one property (the marital home), which she acquired before the marriage. At Husband’s request, Wife put that home in both parties’ names to help Husband obtain a line of credit for his contracting business. Husband began “renovating” that house, but it was left gutted and uninhabitable.

The other two parcels belonged to Wife’s mother, who deeded them to Husband and Wife during the marriage when she was seriously ill. Husband was supposed to renovate the mother’s home on that property and get it appraised. Instead, Husband demolished Wife’s mother’s house and made her move into a camper, which he later told her to leave. By trial, both houses that Husband had worked on were destroyed or unlivable.

At trial, Wife was 55 years old and in good health. She had a high-school education and a real estate license. She spent most of the marriage as a stay-at-home mother and did paperwork for Husband’s business. During rhe marriage, Wife got her real estate license to help Husband flip houses, but that venture did not produce income.

Just before the divorce, Wife began working as an administrative assistant, earning about $34,000 per year. Husband, 57 and in good health, also has a high-school education (with some college and welding training) and works as a self-employed contractor. Husband’s income was about $44,472 per year, i.e., roughly $10,000 more per year than Wife’s income.

The trial court divided the marital estate unequally. It awarded Wife roughly 60% of the marital assets and Husband 40%. Wife received all three real properties (valued at around $444,800) and her personal property (about $64,787), but she also assumed most of the marital debt (over $156,000, largely tied to Husband’s business). Husband received about $177,657 in personal property and only $6,000 in debt.

After tallying assets and debts, Wife’s net share of the estate was approximately $319,000, and Husband’s was about $219,000. To partially equalize the division, the court ordered Wife to pay Husband $47,500. However, it also ordered that this payment be reduced by the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Wife. In effect, Wife’s attorney’s fee award (classified as alimony in solido) offset $14,782 of that equalizing payment. Even after paying Husband roughly $32,718 (the net equalization payment), Wife would leave the marriage with substantially more assets and significantly more debt, whereas Husband would leave with fewer assets but very little debt.

The trial court also awarded Wife several forms of alimony. It found Wife was economically disadvantaged and unable to rehabilitate to a position comparable to Husband. Husband’s greater earning capacity and his fault in the marriage’s breakdown were noted. For the first nine months after trial, Husband was ordered to pay Wife transitional alimony of $1,200 per month (to help cover the outstanding line-of-credit debt) plus an additional $362 per month in support, alongside $638 per month in child support for the one minor child. After nine months, the transitional alimony ends, and Husband must pay Wife $362 per month as alimony in futuro while continuing the $638 child support until the child graduates high school in 2025. Once the child support ends, Husband’s alimony in futuro obligation increases to $500 per month.

Finally, as noted above, the trial court awarded Wife her attorney’s fees in the amount of $14,782 as alimony in solido, which was effectuated by reducing the equalizing payment Wife owed to Husband.

Husband appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on the unequal property division and all forms of alimony.

Tennessee law requires an equitable division of marital property, which does not necessarily mean an equal division. Trial courts have wide discretion in dividing marital assets, and appellate courts give great deference to those decisions. A division of property will not be disturbed on appeal unless it lacks proper evidentiary support or misapplies the relevant legal factors. TCA § 36-4-121(c) lists numerous factors for courts to consider in dividing marital property, such as the duration of the marriage, each spouse’s contributions and needs, the value of each party’s separate property, and so on.

Applying these principles, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the 60/40 property split. Husband argued the trial court should not have given weight to the fact that Wife (and Wife’s mother) contributed the real estate, and he objected to the reduction of his share by the attorney’s fee award. The Court of Appeals noted the trial court had properly considered all the statutory factors and relevant facts. It concluded the unequal distribution was fair under the circumstances and supported by the evidence:

We find no evidence in the record that the court incorrectly considered Wife’s attachment to the real estate; rather, the trial court properly observed that Wife brought one parcel into the marriage while the other two parcels were gifted from her family, thus significantly contributing to the assets of the marital estate. Further, the court appropriately noted Wife had greater separate property at the time of the marriage, including a home with an $8,000 mortgage, while Husband brought only his welding equipment to the marriage.

As for the factors involved in making an equitable distribution, the court found that Husband had a higher annual income, so he was more likely to be able to acquire additional assets. The court properly observed the fact that although Husband was receiving less property, he would leave the marriage with little debt, and Wife will have considerable debt. Additionally, the trial court noted that both structures Husband had started renovating on 264 and 244 Lamar Lawson Road are now uninhabitable.

A review of the record reveals that the trial court specifically addressed all statutory factors that every court must consider in making a division of the marital estate. Our consideration of this case confirms that the trial court’s determinations are not inconsistent with the statutory factors pertaining to the division of property, nor do they lack proper evidentiary support. Under the facts of this case, we find the trial court’s discretion in determining this division to be fair and equitable under the pertinent statutory factors.

Husband also challenged the award of long-term spousal support. Tennessee’s alimony statutes reflect a preference for short-term or rehabilitative alimony over long-term alimony when possible. Alimony in futuro is a form of long-term support that is intended for situations where the economically disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve a post-divorce standard of living that is reasonably comparable to that of the other spouse, despite reasonable efforts to become self-sufficient. In determining alimony, courts must consider the factors in TCA § 36-5-121(i), including each party’s earning capacity, education, age, health, financial needs, the duration of the marriage, each party’s contributions to the marriage, and the relative fault of the parties, among others. Of these, the two most important factors are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the other spouse’s ability to pay.

The Court of Appeals observed that Wife had spent the bulk of this 20-year marriage as a homemaker with only sporadic outside employment, while Husband maintained a higher earning capacity. Given Wife’s limited income and Husband’s greater financial prospects, the Court agreed that Wife could not be fully rehabilitated to a position equal to Husband. The trial court’s decision to award a combination of transitional alimony followed by alimony in futuro was deemed appropriate. Because the evidence showed that Wife would not be able to attain a standard of living comparable to Husband’s on her own, the Court of Appeals upheld the alimony award:

[Our] review of the record does not reveal evidence to support a finding that Wife can be rehabilitated to an appropriate level relative to Husband, who enjoys greater economic potential. We find that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Wife is unable to achieve an earning capacity comparable to Husband. Thus, upon considering the relevant statutory factors and the record, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling as to alimony should be affirmed. The factual findings underpinning the trial court’s analysis are supported by the record. Husband produced no contrary evidence. Consequently, the court had adequate evidence upon which to find that Wife was not capable of supporting herself without rehabilitative and in futuro alimony. Viewing the decision in the light most favorable to the trial court, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion.

Finally, Husband argued that Wife should not have been awarded her attorney’s fees. In Tennessee, an award of attorney’s fees in a divorce case is treated as alimony in solido. Such an award is generally appropriate only if the spouse seeking fees lacks sufficient funds to pay their own attorney and would have to deplete their resources to do so, and if the other spouse has the ability to pay those fees. A spouse who has ample property or income after the property division is usually expected to cover their own legal expenses.

The Court of Appeals noted that Wife was left with significant debt and relatively tight finances, whereas Husband had a higher income and far less debt after the divorce. Wife would have had difficulty paying her legal fees without undermining her financial stability. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to make Husband effectively pay part of Wife’s attorney’s fees (by offsetting them against his equalization payment) was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion:

This is not a case in which the economically disadvantaged spouse had considerable assets to pay her attorney fees. Under the circumstances of this case, an award of alimony in solido for the purpose of paying Wife’s attorney fee is clearly appropriate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife attorney fees in the form of alimony in solido.

Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

K.O.’s Comment: It might surprise some that one spouse walked away with 60% of the marital estate in a 20-year marriage, but Tennessee law prioritizes equity over arithmetic equality. An unequal division can still be perfectly fair. Here, the trial court had good reasons for giving Wife a larger share: she and her family brought significant real estate into the marriage, and Husband’s mismanagement and misconduct (gutting houses and forcing his mother-in-law out of her home) contributed little value; in fact, his actions destroyed value. Tennessee’s appellate courts rarely second-guess a trial judge’s property division unless something went really wrong. By contrast, when a trial court truly misapplies the factors or lacks evidence for its decision, the Court of Appeals will step in. For example, a few years ago, the Court of Appeals reversed a 59/41 property division in a Nashville divorce because the record didn’t support such an imbalance. Such reversals are uncommon, but they remind us that an “equitable” division depends on the facts. Sometimes equity demands 50/50, and sometimes it doesn’t.

Source: Dorsey v. Dorsey (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, March 3, 2026).

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