Facts: Ms. Garvin sued Ms. Shelton.

Ms. Shelton moved to dismiss Ms. Garvin’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ms. Shelton also sought her attorney’s fees per TCA § 20-12-119(c), which requires an award of attorney’s fees when a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Among other things, the trial court denied Ms. Shelton’s motion to dismiss.

Ms. Shelton appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to extend a temporary restraining order for one year. The case was remanded to the trial court for the collection of “costs.”

On remand, Ms. Shelton sought to recover her attorney’s fees per TCA § 20-12-119(c), which the trial court denied.

Ms. Shelton appealed again.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

TCA § 20-12-119(c) provides:

In a civil proceeding, where a trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court shall award the party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending at the time the successful motion to dismiss was granted the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings as a consequence of the dismissed claims by that party or parties. The awarded costs and fees shall be paid by the party or parties whose claim or claims were dismissed as a result of the granted motion to dismiss.

The Court found no merit to Ms. Shelton’s argument:

Our analysis in [the first appeal] focused on the trial court’s extension of the temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Specifically, we did not address the trial court’s denial of Ms. Shelton’s motion to dismiss. Rather, our holding [in the first appeal] was limited to the trial court’s extension of the TRO. As stated in the conclusion of our opinion, “The Trial Court’s final order extending the temporary restraining order for one year is reversed and this cause is remanded to the Knox County Chancery Court for the collection of costs below.”

On remand, the case stands in the same posture it did before the appeal except insofar as the trial court’s judgment has been changed or modified by the appellate court.

Because [Ms. Shelton’s] motion to dismiss was denied in the trial court, and that holding was left undisturbed by this Court in [the first appeal], § 20-12-119(c), which contemplates an award of attorney’s fees and costs when a motion to dismiss is granted, is not applicable. Accordingly, our remand to the trial court [in the first appeal] “for the collection of costs,” denotes collection of the court costs; this language does not contemplate an award of attorney’s fees and costs as there is no legal basis for such award.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Ms. Shelton’s request for attorney’s fees.

Source: Garvin v. Shelton (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, July 9, 2025).

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