Facts: In 2017, Neighbors moved into a home down the street from Stalker and his then-wife. Over the next four years, Mrs. Neighbor and Mrs. Stalker formed a close friendship.

In August 2021, Mrs. Stalker filed for divorce. Apparently blaming Mrs. Neighbor for Mrs. Stalker’s decision to divorce him, Stalker began what Mrs. Neighbor describes as a campaign of verbal abuse, vandalism, and stalking against her and her family. This included spray painting Neighbors’ front door, yelling and texting vulgar comments to them, repeatedly driving motorcycles and other vehicles back-and-forth in front of their home, making throat-cutting and gun-shooting gestures toward their home, and posting disparaging online reviews for the company Mrs. Neighbor owns and runs out of her home.

In March 2022, Mrs. Neighbor obtained an ex parte order of protection, and Stalker was criminally charged for vandalism, assault, and stalking. An agreement was reached whereby the vandalism charge would be dismissed if Stalker refrained from contacting Neighbors.

Less than two months later, Stalker violated the no-contact order when he sped up and crashed his car into Neighbors’ vehicle, totaling it. After the vehicular assault, Stalker was arrested again. Mrs. Neighbor filed another petition for an order of protection. This included the new allegation that Stalker brought his pitbull to the bus stop of Neighbors’ children after having threatened to attack Mrs. Neighbor with the dog.

After a hearing, the general sessions court determined that Stalker’s conduct was stalking and issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Stalker from coming about Mrs. Neighbor or her children, damaging their property, or hurting or threatening any of their animals.

Stalker appealed the order of protection to the circuit court. The hearing began but was cut short because of inclement weather and was scheduled to resume the following month.

Before the hearing could resume, Stalker filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The circuit court dismissed Stalker’s appeal and affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court. Mrs. Neighbor applied for an award of attorney’s fees and expenses totaling $175,000.

The circuit court determined that Mrs. Stalker had no right to a “mandatory” award of fees under TCA’s 36-3-617(a)(1) because (1) Stalker voluntarily dismissed his appeal before the hearing was completed, and (2) stalking victims have no right to the same relief as “domestic abuse victims.” Mrs. Neighbor’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

Mrs. Neighbor appealed.

On Appeal: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

Tennessee law—specifically TCA § 36-3-617(A)(1)—provides that “no domestic abuse victim, stalking victim, or sexual assault victim … shall be required to bear the costs” associated with obtaining an order of protection. If the court issues or extends an order of protection, “all … attorney’s fees shall be assessed against the respondent.” The statute has been interpreted to leave trial courts with “little maneuvering room” when evaluating a request for attorney’s fees.

Mrs. Neighbor argued that the trial court erred in denying her attorney fee claim because a stalking victim has the right to the same protection and relief as a domestic abuse victim. The Court agreed:

There is nothing in the plain language of § 36-3-617(a)(1) to indicate that domestic abuse victims should receive “enhanced protection” while the other categories of victims listed therein, such as stalking victims, should not.

As our Supreme Court elucidated in New v. Dumitrache: “By enacting sections 36-3-617 and -618, the General Assembly made clear that victims of domestic violence are not to be burdened with the costs of obtaining or defending orders of protection necessary to ensure their protection.” Stalking victims are entitled to the same protection and relief as domestic abuse victims. Thus, Mrs. [Neighbor] was entitled to the same “enhanced protection” and relief as a domestic abuse victim.

Stalker argued the trial court lacked authority to award attorney’s fees because he voluntarily dismissed his appeal before the hearing concluded. The Court was not persuaded:

It is undisputed that a hearing was conducted and completed in the general sessions court, and after that hearing, an order of protection was issued. [Stalker] appealed the general sessions judgment, but he dismissed his appeal before a hearing could be completed in the circuit court. Consequently, the circuit court entered a judgment affirming the issuance of the order of protection by the general sessions court. Thus, the order of protection at issue in this case was entered after a hearing, and that order was affirmed upon the dismissal of [Stalker’s] appeal.

What occurred in the general sessions court was not nullified by [Stalker’s] appeal because he dismissed his appeal before a decision on the merits. The fact that a hearing was not completed in the circuit court or that an additional order of protection was not issued or extended after a hearing in the circuit court is of no consequence.

*     *     *     *     *

A respondent like [Stalker] should not be permitted to avoid the fee-shifting mechanism in § 36-3-617 by appealing an order of protection against him, causing the victim to accrue further costs, and then dismissing the appeal in the final hour before the circuit court has a chance to complete the de novo hearing. To do so would pervert the interests of justice, frustrate legislative intent, and construct an inharmonious, illogical, and absurd reading of § 36-3-617(a)(1).

In the case at bar, the general sessions court held a hearing on the petition for order of protection after which the court issued an order of protection against [Stalker]. [Stalker] appealed, but before the circuit court could complete the de novo hearing, [Stalker] dismissed his appeal. Based on these facts, Mrs. [Neighbor] contends her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees must be taxed against [Stalker] as mandated by TCA § 36-3-617. We agree.

The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding attorney’s fees and remanded the case to award Mrs. Neighbor the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in obtaining the order of protection in the general sessions court and successfully defending the appeal of that judgment to the circuit court. Mrs. Neighbor was also awarded the attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal.

Source: Faddoul v. Beyer (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, April 16, 2025).

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