Facts: Mother and Father are the divorced parents of Child. Their parenting plan gave Father 132 days of parenting time. It also vested Mother with sole decision-making authority over nonemergency healthcare.
Father petitioned to modify the parenting schedule and change medical decision-making authority from Mother’s sole authority to joint authority.
At the hearing, Father proved that Child’s needs had evolved as he grew older and school and extracurricular schedules changed. He also proved that the parents sometimes failed to communicate well or make parenting decisions together.
For example, one year, Mother waited so long to select her summer vacation dates that Father was unable to take his allotted vacation. The next year, Mother waited to take vacation until after Child was back in school. Mother also refused Father’s request for vacation time, characterizing it as “refusing to bring [Child] back” and filing police reports.
For another example, Mother accused Father of failing to contribute toward Child’s medical, school, and extracurricular bills before admitting she never sent him receipts or asked for reimbursement.
Regarding medical decision-making, Mother did not notify Father that the doctor had prescribed ADHD medication to Child. She admitted that, as of the day of trial, she still had not told Father that Child was prescribed ADHD medication. A document from Child’s school had a note stating, “Dad not on board for medication. School giving it on dad’s parenting time.” Mother explained she spoke with the school nurse about giving Child medication on those days.
The trial court had concerns about Mother’s credibility, noting she had a “selective memory” and was “inconsistent and evasive in her testimony” regarding why others believe Father would not give Child medication of which Father had no knowledge.
The trial court modified the residential schedule to change her sole decision-making authority to joint decision-making authority because she “had not demonstrated the ability and desire to cooperate with Father in decision-making regarding Child’s health care.”
Mother appealed.
On Appeal: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
When a parent petitions to modify a parenting plan, the trial court applies a two-step analysis. The threshold issue is whether a material change in circumstances has occurred since the court adopted the current parenting plan. If a material change has occurred, the court must then examine the statutory best-interest factors to determine whether modifying the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest.
Here, the material change was the child’s changed schedule as he grew older, his parents’ struggle to make parenting decisions together, and questions about Mother’s willingness to facilitate Child’s relationship with Father and follow the terms of the parenting plan.
The Court found ample justification for the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan:
The child had close bonds with Father’s extended family and spent most weekends with Father working and playing on the family farm. His relationship with Father’s girlfriend was “one of affection and love.” Father had positive things to say about Mother as a parent. By contrast, Mother spent the majority of her testimony complaining about Father. And evidence showed that she had refused to allow Father summer vacation time and had failed to disclose that medicine had been prescribed to the child. Mother asks this Court to reevaluate these factors in light of other considerations: she took the child to the doctor, tutoring, and church; sent Father photos of the child; bought the child clothes; and did homework with the child. But that is not our role. And the trial court need not explicitly discuss every established fact in its best interest analysis.
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[The trial court] did not ignore negative testimony about Father. It found that Father could not effectively communicate with Mother. Still, the court was more concerned that Mother’s testimony indicated that she may not possess the willingness or ability to encourage a loving relationship between the child and Father.
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The Court applied the correct law, the evidence does not preponderate against its factual findings, and its decision is within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.
The Court affirmed the trial court judgment and awarded Father his attorney’s fees on appeal.
K.O.’s Comment: The trial court changed Mother’s sole decision-making authority for nonemergency healthcare to joint decision-making authority because Mother “had not demonstrated the ability and desire to cooperate with Father in decision-making regarding Child’s health care.” That sounds like an argument for giving Father sole decision-making authority over nonemergency healthcare.
There are many appellate decisions directing trial courts to award sole decision-making authority to one parent “where the parents are unable to agree on matters of great importance to the welfare of their child.” See, e.g., Coley v. Coley, No. M2007-00655-COA-R3-CV, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008). Tennessee caselaw also says joint decision-making is not possible between parents who cannot communicate effectively. See, e.g., Smart v. Smart, No. M2012-00818-COA-R3-CV, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2013).
While it was certainly within the trial court’s discretion to do what it did, I’m surprised Mother thought it was reversible error. If anything, she might have been fortunate to retain joint decision-making. It’s appropriate that she pay Father’s attorney’s fees on appeal.
Source: Thompson v. Thompson (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, November 26, 2024).
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